

RESEARCH WHITE PAPER

Quantifying the Sim-to-Real Governance Gap: Physical Validation of Trust-Proportional Authority Computation for Autonomous Systems

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4 U.S. Provisional Patents | 33 Published Works (DOIs) | 12 Hardware Reference Designs | 19 Validated Simulations

Portfolio: burakoktenli.com | Simulations: authrex.systems

1. The Problem: Autonomous Authority Is Governed as a Binary, Not a Graded Function

Autonomous systems in defense operate in environments where sensor degradation, whether from adversarial electronic warfare or environmental conditions, occurs during mission-critical operations. DoDD 3000.09 (January 2023) mandates “appropriate levels of human judgment” in autonomous weapon systems. The JADC2 framework requires trusted authority delegation in denied environments. The Replicator initiative is scaling autonomous platforms to fielded formations. Yet the state of practice remains binary: fully autonomous or fully manual. Continuous, trust-proportional authority governance, which would degrade and recover operational authority in proportion to measured sensor trust, is largely absent from current practice.

This binary approach causes two documented failure modes. NHTSA’s Standing General Order data records 807 AV-involved crashes (2021–2024, SGO-2021-01), which underscore the operational stakes of sensor degradation in deployed autonomy. GAO-22-104154 identifies trust in AI systems as a primary barrier to DoD AI adoption. The Department has institutionalized this concern, standing up a Center for Calibrated Trust Measurement and Evaluation in 2023, yet the runtime computational mechanism for trust-proportional authority remains unspecified.

The open research question: Can a formally specified, trust-proportional authority computation produce correct governance behavior on physical hardware under adversarial sensor conditions? If so, how much does performance degrade relative to simulation predictions? To my knowledge, no published work answers this question. No dataset of continuous authority transitions on a physical autonomous platform under controlled adversarial conditions exists in the literature. This work proposes to produce that dataset.

2. Technical Approach: HMAA + SATA Governance Pipeline

The proposed research validates two specific governance modules on a physical autonomous platform:

SATA (Sensor Attestation and Trust Anchoring): Computes a continuous trust scalar $\tau \in [0,1]$ from multi-sensor Dempster-Shafer evidence fusion. D-S is chosen over Bayesian fusion because it represents ignorance explicitly (no prior $P(\text{spoofing})$ required) and produces high conflict mass as a diagnostic signal for adversarial deception. Under coordinated spoofing, where conflicting evidence can drive Dempster combination toward known instability, SATA applies Shafer discounting to bound any single source and treats sustained high conflict mass as itself a trust-degrading signal rather than a quantity to normalize away. Validating this behavior under the compound-attack scenario is part of the proposed work. U.S. Provisional Patent 64/002,453.

HMAA (Human-Machine Authority Architecture): Computes graded authority $A = A_{\text{base}} \times G(\tau) \times D(\Delta\tau) \times \tau$ across four levels: A3 (full autonomy, 100% speed), A2 (restricted, 50% speed), A1 (minimal, 25% speed, return-to-home), A0 (revoked, motors disabled). Hysteresis bands prevent oscillation. Dwell enforcement requires sustained trust for upward transitions. Specified in TLA+ and verified by TLC (48,751 states, 8 safety properties). U.S. Provisional Patent 63/999,105.

These two modules are the foundational stages of a larger governance framework (AUTHREX) comprising seven architectures for authority lifecycle management. This study validates only HMAA and SATA, the stages all others depend on, because no amount of architectural sophistication matters if the core trust computation does not survive contact with real sensor noise.

3. Proposed Research: Three Hypotheses, 75 Physical Runs

The adversary modeled has physical proximity and sensor-level access, meaning the ability to occlude, spoof, or inject noise into individual sensor channels, but no access to the compute platform, firmware, or network; platform and supply-chain threats are deferred to later phases on higher-fidelity hardware. The research tests three falsifiable hypotheses on a physical rover testbed (37 components, \$484 BOM, ROS 2, operational) under adversarial sensor fault injection across five scenarios (ultrasonic occlusion, phantom obstacle, IMU drift, communication disruption, compound attack):

H1 (Trust Monotonicity): Sensor fault injection produces monotonically decreasing SATA trust scores on physical hardware. Test: Spearman ρ across 75 runs. Supported if $\rho < -0.7$. Rejected if $\rho > -0.3$, which would indicate that real sensor noise disrupts the D-S fusion model and would direct corrective research.

H2 (Authority Safety): HMAA produces fewer unsafe actions than a binary threshold baseline on the same physical inputs. Test: McNemar's paired test, $p < 0.05$. An "unsafe action" is defined as any actuator command exceeding the speed or turn-rate envelope for the current authority level.

H3 (Transfer Fidelity): The sim-to-real transfer ratio $R = (\text{physical unsafe rate}) / (\text{simulation unsafe rate})$ is ≤ 3.0 . Rejected if $R > 3.0$, indicating the simulation model requires fundamental revision.

$N = 75$ (15 runs \times 5 scenarios). One-sample proportion test: 80% power to detect a true unsafe rate exceeding 20% at $\alpha = 0.05$. Every outcome is scientifically productive: confirmation validates the governance model; rejection identifies specific failure modes for corrective research.

Methodological Contribution: R-Decomposition

Beyond the governance validation, the research produces a reusable framework for quantifying sim-to-real governance transfer. For any $R > 1.5$, root-cause attribution decomposes the gap into three sources: (a) sensor noise model mismatch, quantified by Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test against the simulation's Gaussian assumption; (b) computation timing jitter, measured by ROS 2 callback timestamps against idealized 100 Hz; and (c) actuator response lag. To my knowledge, no published work provides this decomposition for autonomous systems governance. The framework is reusable: any governance architecture validated in simulation could apply R-decomposition to quantify its real-world readiness.

4. Prior Work and Evidence Base

This research is backed by 24 months of independent work producing:

- 4 U.S. provisional patents for governance architectures (HMAA, SATA, CARA, FLAME)
- 33 published works with DOIs (18 Zenodo deposits + 15 SSRN papers) and a ten-volume technical reference series, all independently verifiable via ORCID 0009-0001-8573-1667
- 19 interactive governance simulations totaling 37,000+ lines of code with seeded PRNGs for reproducibility
- 350 simulation runs across 7 adversarial scenarios: SATA-HMAA achieves 3.4% unsafe action rate vs. 42.3% for binary threshold and 18.7% for Simplex switching (Seto et al. 1998)
- TLA+ formal specifications verified by TLC model checker (48,751 states, 8 safety properties)
- Twelve hardware reference designs spanning eleven application domains (defense, automotive, maritime, critical infrastructure, orbital, counter-UAS, agentic-AI, swarm,

IT/OT, and financial-sector), each with complete BOMs and electrical specifications; all except the operational rover testbed used in the proposed research are paper designs at TRL 2-4 whose verification campaigns are not yet executed

- HMAA parameter sensitivity analysis specified across 4 parameters (damping coefficient, trust gate, hysteresis width, dwell time) with $\pm 30\%$ robustness criterion (to be executed on physical data in the proposed research)

This work is currently at the simulation and formal verification stage (TRL 2-4). The physical rover testbed used in the proposed research exists, is operational, and runs ROS 2. The SATA and HMAA codebases exist and have been validated in simulation. The proposed research does not require building new architectures; it requires running and measuring existing, working systems on existing, operational hardware.

5. Significance and Future Directions

This work bears on a problem of broad significance to autonomous-systems safety:

- The sim-to-real transfer problem for governance is unsolved and strategically urgent. As DoD scales autonomous mass through Replicator and fields AI-enabled command under JADC2, platforms increasingly require runtime governance that survives real-world sensor conditions. The question of whether formally verified governance transfers from simulation to hardware is the bottleneck.
- The proposed experimental design (falsifiable hypotheses, statistical power analysis, R-decomposition methodology, noise characterization pipeline) produces actionable data regardless of outcome. A positive result validates the approach. A negative result identifies what breaks and why, directing future investment.
- The broader AUTHREX framework (7 architectures: SATA, HMAA, CARA, FLAME, MAIVA, ADARA, ERAM) addresses the complete authority lifecycle from sensor trust through deliberation windows to recovery and escalation control. Physical validation of HMAA + SATA is the necessary first step. Subsequent work extends to FPGA hardware enforcement, UAV platforms, Learning-Enabled Component integration, and cross-domain governance.

Taken together, the contribution is a falsifiable, hardware-grounded test of whether formally specified authority governance survives real sensor conditions, accompanied by a reusable methodology for quantifying that transfer for any governance architecture validated in simulation.

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