Burak Oktenli is an independent researcher and analyst working at the intersection of artificial intelligence governance, national security, and critical infrastructure resilience. His public-source research examines how authority, accountability, and human oversight should be structured for autonomous and AI-enabled systems in safety-critical settings. This page collects his published commentary, externally cited work, and governance research relevant to policymakers, researchers, and public-sector institutions.
Burak Oktenli is a policy-oriented researcher focused on the governance of autonomous and AI-enabled systems in defense, critical infrastructure, and other safety-critical domains. His work examines a recurring question across these settings: when an automated system acts faster than a person can intervene, under whose authority did it act, and who is accountable for the result. He develops public-source analysis and technical governance frameworks that treat authority, accountability, and auditability as design requirements rather than afterthoughts. His research includes seven governance architectures addressing sensor trust, human-machine authority, escalation risk, and recovery, several of which are formally specified and machine-verified. He has published commentary with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and other defense outlets, and his work has been cited in the United States Federal Register and in academic research. He contributes to standards discussion as a stakeholder participant in a NIST AI Risk Management Framework community of interest. He holds an MBA and is completing a Master of Professional Studies in Applied Intelligence at Georgetown University. He works independently and is not affiliated with, nor does he represent, any government agency or intergovernmental body.
Examines how decision authority for AI systems should be bounded, assigned, and made reviewable, so responsibility stays clear as autonomy increases.
Studies how safety-critical and operational-technology environments maintain control and continuity under cyber-physical stress and automated failure.
Analyzes the human-oversight requirements for systems that can act below human reaction time, including how and when control passes between human and machine.
Focuses on the security and governance of industrial control and OT environments where digital decisions carry physical consequences.
Considers how machine-speed decision support and autonomy affect crisis stability, escalation dynamics, and the timing of human deliberation.
Produces analysis built entirely from open and credible sources, with stated assumptions and confidence levels, intended to inform rather than advocate.
These commentaries draw on a broader body of governance research, including seven governance architectures and 48 open-access works (31 Zenodo DOIs and 17 SSRN working papers). The complete catalogue is on the Publications page.
Each source is counted once however many times it has cited the work, and a syndicated article is counted once however many outlets carry it. Dated entries with verifiable links follow below and on the impact record.
Invited by the French international broadcaster for live analysis of a reported autonomous drone strike, arguing that the demand for a human in the loop is obsolete for weapons that navigate by onboard camera because the link can be jammed, and that a system’s permission to strike should lapse automatically when sensor integrity or target evidence falls below the level that justified the mission. This is an invitation to speak as a subject-matter expert rather than a citation of published work.
A public comment by Burak Oktenli (NHTSA-2026-0529-0007) is cited by name in footnote 10 of the notice at 91 FR 30789, Docket NHTSA-2026-0529.
A peer-reviewed article cites the applicant’s Geopolitical Monitor analysis of counter-drone reciprocity as the source for its account of ten-year security agreements exchanging air-defence capability for counter-drone expertise. His first citation in a peer-reviewed journal issued by a major academic publisher.
The Escalation Risk Assessment Model (ERAM) is cited as Reference #4 in “The Ethics of AI in U.S. Warfare.”
"Cognition, Agency, and Authority: A Taxonomy of Advanced AI Systems with Military Implications" cites the author's working paper on AI-enabled military decision-making and escalation risk (endnote 39) in support of its analysis of strategic risk in cognitively sophisticated AI systems.
“From Frontier to Shadow AI: A Simmering Threat to Assurance and Security in Critical Infrastructure” cites the applicant's SSRN analysis of AI outpacing human clearance models (reference 41), in a study of 27 Australian critical-infrastructure organizations.
“Unsupervised Detection of Underground Tunnels in Ground-Penetrating Radar Using Depth-Restricted Reconstruction Scoring” cites the author's SSRN paper Strategic Subterranean Domain Awareness (SSRN 6046594) as reference [1], with two in-body citations on pipeline-monitoring early warning and the tunnel detection problem.
A syndicated investigative feature quotes the applicant’s Articles of War analysis directly on where responsibility for an autonomous system’s actions properly sits, identifies him as an independent researcher on artificial-intelligence systems and their governance, and sets the underlying proposition in display type. Recorded as one citation carried by six outlets.
A Washington national-security policy institute carried the applicant’s analysis in its daily brief on three separate occasions, distributed to a policy and congressional readership.
A non-governmental research institution translated one of the applicant’s analyses in full, credited the original outlet, linked his author page there, and marked the translation as the institute’s own work. The first instance of his work being translated and republished by a research institution.
A curated research portal maintained by a retired Indian Army major general, formerly senior directing staff at his country’s National Defence College, has selected eight of the applicant’s pieces and, on five occasions, written original analysis extending the argument before inviting its professional readership to debate it.
This is a selection. Twenty-nine distinct external sources across fifteen countries have cited, quoted, republished or built on this work, spanning government, academic, institutional, practitioner and media references. Source links and the full record are on the Citations and Recognition page.
As autonomous and AI-enabled systems take on time-critical decisions in defense and critical infrastructure, a gap is opening between what these systems can do and the frameworks meant to hold them accountable. When a system acts faster than a person can intervene, existing oversight models struggle with a basic question: under whose authority did it act, and who is responsible for the outcome? Closing that gap means separating evidence-based risks from speculation and defining clear criteria for bounded authority, accountability, and auditable control. These are the questions this research examines.
This research is built on public and openly available sources, credible institutional and government reports, and peer-reviewed literature where available. Assumptions are stated, confidence levels are noted, and claims are verifiable through the cited sources. The work does not rely on, claim, or imply access to classified information, and it has not been reviewed or endorsed by any government agency.
Inquiries: info@burakoktenli.com