| blade-infra-simulation.html | Interactive governance simulator · 9-module pipeline v3.11 · 6 threat scenarios | Mar 2026 |
| blade-infra-BLUEPRINT.pdf | Full engineering blueprint (92 components) | Mar 2026 |
| blade-infra-BOM.csv | 62-component BOM with costs and verified sources (CSV) | Mar 2026 |
| blade-infra-ELECTRICAL.json | 82 electrical connections with protocols and voltages (JSON) | Mar 2026 |
| blade-infra-MECHANICAL.json | 67 mechanical connections with fastener specs (JSON) | Mar 2026 |
| blade-infra-CONFIG.json | Full system configuration with component parameters (JSON) | Mar 2026 |
| blade-infra-GUIDE.md | Assembly guide with fail-safe wiring and ISO 26262 checklist (MD) | Mar 2026 |
| blade-infra-schematic.png | System schematic diagram (92 components, color-coded) | Mar 2026 |
| LICENSE | CC BY 4.0 | Mar 2026 |
BLADE-INFRA Governance Node
Authority-Governed Critical Infrastructure Governance Node for ICS/SCADA Protection
An authority-governed critical infrastructure protection node for ICS/SCADA systems, power grid monitoring, water treatment, and pipeline operations. Implements the 9-module governance pipeline (SATA → ADARA → IFF → HMAA → MAIVA → FLAME → CARA → BDA → EFFECTOR) with Pilz PNOZ S7.1 SIL-3 safety relay. IEC 61850 GOOSE, Modbus TCP/RTU, PROFINET IO, and 4-20mA HART sensor integration. SIL 3 / IP65 / NERC CIP / FIPS 140-2 Level 3.
Publication
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19277887
Author: Burak Oktenli · Georgetown University, MPS Applied Intelligence
ORCID: 0009-0001-8573-1667
License: CC BY 4.0 · Version: v3.11 · March 2026
Key Specifications
- Compute: NVIDIA Jetson AGX Orin 64GB + Trenz TE0808-05 Zynq UltraScale+ SoM
- Sensors: 4× CT sensors, 3× PT sensors, ADE9000 power analyzer, ultrasonic flow, pressure transducers, RTD probes, humidity sensors, multi-gas detector
- Comms: LTE Cat-M1, Iridium 9603 SBD, ESP32-S3 WiFi/BLE, IEEE 1588 PTP NIC
- Security: ATECC608B HSM (×2), TPM 2.0, TPS3823 watchdog, Zynq eFUSE SecureBoot
- Environment: IP65, SIL 3, -40°C to +70°C, thermoelectric cooling, DIN-rail mount
- Safety: Pilz PNOZ S7.1 SIL-3 safety relay (dual-channel, Cat. 4). Zynq PASS + Jetson APPROVE required. Hardware watchdog independent reset.
- BOM: $43,477 prototype (92 components)
9-Module Pipeline (v3.11)
- SATA: Dempster-Shafer fusion over power quality, process, and environmental sensor channels
- ADARA: ICS protocol anomaly detection (Modbus, IEC 61850, PROFINET) with Stuxnet-class pattern matching
- IFF: SCADA master station authentication via ATECC608B with IEC 62351 certificate verification
- HMAA: Trust-proportional authority over actuator commands (breaker trip, valve shutoff, pump control)
- MAIVA: Multi-controller consensus across distributed ICS nodes with Byzantine fault tolerance
- FLAME: Mandatory deliberation windows before safety-critical actuator commands (breaker, valve, pump)
- CARA: GREP-phase recovery with SIL 3 safe-state enforcement and NERC CIP event logging
- BDA: Post-event trust revalidation and NERC CIP incident reporting
- EFFECTOR: Pilz PNOZ S7.1 SIL-3 safety relay with hardwired actuator authority gating
Threat Scenarios (Simulator)
- Power grid fault — IEC 61850 GOOSE trip command under degraded sensor trust
- Water treatment overdose — Modbus TCP chemical dosing anomaly detection
- Pipeline leak — Modbus RTU pressure/flow sensor trust degradation
- SCADA intrusion — unauthorized command injection via compromised HMI
- Sensor drift — gradual calibration degradation across 4-20mA HART channels
- HITL override — operator SCADA terminal manual authority intervention
Related Work
- SATA:
10.5281/zenodo.18936251 - HMAA:
10.5281/zenodo.18861653 - CARA:
10.5281/zenodo.18917790 - ADARA:
10.5281/zenodo.19043924 - MAIVA:
10.5281/zenodo.19015517 - FLAME:
10.5281/zenodo.19015618
Author
Burak Oktenli
Georgetown University, M.P.S. Applied Intelligence
ORCID: 0009-0001-8573-1667
Website: burakoktenli.com