| README.md | Repository overview, architecture, consensus protocol, and usage | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-paper.pdf | Working paper: Authority-Governed Decentralized Swarm Consensus for Byzantine-Tolerant, Contested-RF Coordination | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-simulation.html | Interactive browser simulator · N=10/50/500 · five scripted scenarios · live pipeline and audit ledger | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-AUTHREX_SWARM.tla | TLA+ formal specification: five safety invariants + three liveness properties; extends the AUTHREX_MAIVA design (no refinement mapping is checked) | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-verification-report.md | Verification report: safety/liveness property summaries (its TLC figures are illustrative; model-checking output not yet published) | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-simulation-audit.md | Simulation methodology: simulator design, assumptions, threat model, and test scenarios | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-CONFIG.json | Master configuration: node definitions, electrical and mechanical connection maps | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-ELECTRICAL.json | Electrical connection map: power rails and data interfaces across subsystems | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-MECHANICAL.json | Mechanical attachment map: frame mounts, masts, and connectors | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-PARTS.csv | Reference bill of materials with interfaces and cost (CSV) | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-build-guide.md | Build and integration guide for the reference node | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-assembly-guide.md | Node assembly guide for the proposed N=10 testbed (not built) | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-schematic.pdf | Electrical design system schematic (node-graph view, color-coded by subsystem type) | May 2026 |
| blade-swarm-zenodo.json | Zenodo deposit metadata (authors, keywords, related identifiers) | May 2026 |
| LICENSE | CC BY 4.0 for the deposit (see its Zenodo record); code and simulations on this site are offered under the MIT License | May 2026 |
Note on the release line in these files. blade-swarm-zenodo.json, blade-swarm-AUTHREX_SWARM.tla, blade-swarm-assembly-guide.md and blade-swarm-verification-report.md, as deposited, describe the material as approved for public release with unlimited distribution (“Distribution Statement A”). The author wrote that line himself. It is not a U.S. government distribution statement: no government office reviewed or cleared this material. The files are kept here exactly as deposited on Zenodo.
BLADE-SWARM Governance Node
Beam-Layer Authority for Directed Engagements, Swarm Node - Reference Architecture, Simulator, and Formal Specification
An authority-governance layer for decentralized autonomous swarms operating in contested and RF-denied environments. In the design and its simulator, each agent runs a two-phase consensus designed for Byzantine fault tolerance, gated by computed peer trust (SATA), the four-tier HMAA authority state, and weighted multi-agent voting (MAIVA) before the swarm commits to a coordinated action. The protocol is designed to tolerate up to f = (N-1)/3 compromised agents per quorum (the Byzantine bound S5 is an assumption, not a verified result), with a quorum-intersection safety bound, to resist Sybil attacks via attested per-node identity, and to default to a safe halt under denied or degraded RF. Every step writes a signed entry into a hash-chained distributed audit ledger gossiped across the mesh. It specifies the seven-stage AUTHREX pipeline (SENSE, SATA, ADARA + IFF, HMAA, MAIVA, FLAME, ERAM + CARA) with a four-tier HMAA model (T3/T2/T1/T0), parameterized over N = 10, 50, and 500. Eighth platform in the BLADE family.
This is a reference architecture, simulator, and formal specification (TRL 3-4 simulator and formal spec; TRL 2 proposed testbed design, not built). No hardware has been fabricated. All parameter values are synthetic research placeholders. The architecture governs decision authority and audit; it does not govern weapons. No federal endorsement is claimed and no empirical claims are made about specific systems, operations, or named officials.
Publication
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20351198
Author: Burak Oktenli · Independent researcher
ORCID: 0009-0001-8573-1667
License: CC BY 4.0 (deposit, as recorded on Zenodo); code on this site also offered under the MIT License · Version: v1.0 · May 2026 · Document ID: ICD-SWARM-001 v1.0 · Working paper WP-2026-08
Consensus and Authority Model
- SATA (peer trust): continuous per-peer trust scoring from attested identity, behavioural consistency, and audit-chain integrity; low-trust peers are down-weighted and excluded from quorum formation
- HMAA (authority tier): four tiers (T3 autonomous / T2 supervised / T1 confirmed / T0 halt); tier escalation requires quorum agreement, tier downgrade is asymmetric and can be triggered unilaterally for safety
- MAIVA (weighted voting): sub-quorum decomposition with Dempster-Shafer weighted voting and a quorum-intersection bound intended to preserve safety while no more than f = (N-1)/3 agents per quorum are compromised (a design assumption; not verified)
- FLAME + CARA (timing and recovery): FLAME contracts the deliberation window under threat density and expands it under ambiguity; CARA is designed to provide bounded-liveness recovery and isolates misbehaving agents with a corrective audit entry
- Root of trust: per-node ECDSA P-256 keypair on a Microchip ATECC608B secure element (private key never leaves the chip); hash-chained distributed audit ledger gossiped over the mesh
Reference Hardware Design (per node; not built)
- Frame and propulsion: Holybro X500 V2 quadrotor kit (4x 2216 KV880 motors, 4x BLHeli_S 20A ESC, 1045 props, integrated PDB)
- Flight controller: Pixhawk 6X autopilot (triple-redundant IMU)
- Companion compute: Raspberry Pi 5 8GB with active cooler
- Mesh radio: LoRa SX1276 (915 MHz control plane) + Wi-Fi 6 USB (telemetry plane)
- Navigation: Holybro M9N GNSS module with magnetometer on a mast
- Root of trust: Microchip ATECC608B secure element; governance-bus level shifter (TXB0108)
- Power: 4S 5000 mAh LiPo; addressable status LED ring for tier indication
- Reference BOM: approximately $1,333 per node (optional camera +$50); approximately $13.3K for the proposed N=10 testbed baseline
Formal Specification (TLA+)
AUTHREX_SWARM.tlaextends the AUTHREX_MAIVA design (no refinement mapping is checked) with sub-quorum decomposition, Byzantine fault bounds, FLAME deliberation-window contraction, tier-downgrade asymmetry, and CARA bounded liveness- Five safety invariants (S1 TierCeiling through S5 ByzantineBound) and three liveness properties (L1 EventualCommitOrAbort through L3 CARATermination)
- TLA+ specification stating 5 safety and 3 liveness properties; model-checking output not yet published (the verification report's TLC figures are illustrative); S5, the Byzantine bound, is an assumption, not a result
Simulator Scenarios
- S1 Nominal - healthy swarm, all agents T3, clean RF; consensus commits
- S2 Single Byzantine agent - one compromised node attempts an unauthorized commit; quorum intersection rejects it
- S3 Sybil probe - spoofed-identity peers; SATA and attested identity exclude them from quorum
- S4 Contested RF - degraded mesh; FLAME contracts and the swarm safe-halts by default
- S5 Denied / degraded - link loss beyond the Byzantine bound; tier downgrade to T0 with signed audit
Standards Alignment (self-assessed)
- DoDD 3000.09 (autonomy in weapon systems; authority tier model mapped to HMAA T3/T2/T1/T0; governs decision authority, not weapons)
- FY26 NDAA (autonomous-systems assurance and audit provisions)
- NIST AI RMF 1.0 (govern, map, measure, manage; reflected in authority gating and tamper-evident audit)
Related Work
- SATA:
10.5281/zenodo.18936251 - HMAA:
10.5281/zenodo.18861653 - CARA:
10.5281/zenodo.18917790 - ADARA:
10.5281/zenodo.19043924 - MAIVA:
10.5281/zenodo.19015517 - FLAME:
10.5281/zenodo.19015618 - BLADE-EDGE (defense):
10.5281/zenodo.19177472 - BLADE-AV (automotive):
10.5281/zenodo.19232130 - BLADE-MARITIME (maritime):
10.5281/zenodo.19246785 - BLADE-INFRA (critical infrastructure):
10.5281/zenodo.19277887 - BLADE-SPACE (orbital):
10.5281/zenodo.20183269 - BLADE-CUAS (counter-UAS):
10.5281/zenodo.20299604 - BLADE-AGENT-HSM (agentic AI):
10.5281/zenodo.20299821 - BLADE-INFRA-OT (IT/OT bridge):
10.5281/zenodo.20342067 - BLADE-FINANCE (financial sector):
10.5281/zenodo.20374692
Author
Burak Oktenli (independent researcher)
ORCID: 0009-0001-8573-1667
Website: burakoktenli.com