Orbital Hardware Research Platform

BLADE-SPACE Governance Node

BLADE-SPACE = Beam-Layer Authority for Directed Engagements, Space-Edge Node

A radiation-tolerant, hot-redundant orbital governance node that serves as the ethical decision-making authority for autonomous LEO platforms, determining in real-time whether systems should EXECUTE, DELAY, ABORT, or enter CARA safe-mode based on multi-sensor trust consensus - operating beyond ground-loop latency.

Preliminary Design Phase (TRL 2-3) · 15-Document Engineering Package · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20183269

This is NOT a weapon. It is a space-qualified governance layer - a radiation-tolerant, hot-redundant hardware-enforced ethical checkpoint between autonomous orbital platforms and authority-gated actions (propulsive maneuvers, payload firing, rendezvous-proximity operations). The platform extends DoD Directive 3000.09 and human-judgment governance into the space domain, beyond ground-loop latency.

Launch Governance Simulator Zenodo Record Repository Evaluation Protocol SDK Integration
Type: Space-Edge Hardware Research Focus: Autonomous Orbital Governance · Radiation-Tolerant Edge Compute · Authority-Gated Decisions Status: Preliminary Design Phase (TRL 2-3) · 15-Document Engineering Package DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20183269 Document ID: BLADE-SPACE-SRD-001 r1.0

Key Contributions

  • First reference design extending the AUTHREX authority-governance stack into the orbital domain (TRL 2-3 Preliminary Design Phase)
  • Complete 9-stage governance pipeline (SATA → ADARA → IFF → HMAA → MAIVA → FLAME → CARA → BDA → EFFECTOR) on radiation-tolerant compute
  • Hot-redundant compute architecture: Microchip RTG4 FPGA (primary + backup) + Aitech S-A1760 Venus SBC (primary + backup) with <200 ms failover
  • Three-fault-tolerant payload/thruster firing path: two independent normally-open solid-state relays + pyrotechnic isolation
  • ECDSA-anchored audit chain: P-256 keypair in rad-tolerant TPM, hash continuity across reboots and brown-outs
  • ADARA multi-constellation GNSS cross-correlation for spoofing detection (primary + backup NovAtel OEM7600-RG receivers)
  • 30 krad TID design behind 3 mm Al equivalent shielding; LEO 400-1200 km, 5-year design life (7-year stretch)
  • 91-component BOM, $505,440 reference cost, 11.0 kg estimated mass (12.0 kg allocation), 134 W nominal / 193 W peak on 28V bus

Engineering Package: 15 engineering design documents in blade-space-repo.zip - System Requirements Document (25 traceable requirements), Requirements Traceability Matrix, FMEA (35 failure modes, 7 catastrophic), Hazard Analysis (10 hazards, 3 critical with three-fault-tolerant mitigations), V&V Plan (20-test campaign), Power / Mass / Thermal Budgets, 11 Interface Control Documents, Reliability Analysis, Radiation Analysis (30 krad TID, SEU/SEE), Assembly & Integration Plan, Configuration Management Plan. Published on Zenodo: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20183269.

91
Components
134
Electrical Connections
9
Pipeline Stages
~$505K
Reference BOM
<300ms
Decision Latency
11.0 kg
Mass (12.0 kg allocation)
30 krad
TID Tolerance
5 yr
LEO Mission Life
BLADE-SPACE Governance Node system schematic: 91-component node graph showing all subsystems (compute, sensors, communications, power, security) with 134 electrical connections, color-coded by node type (MCU, Sensor, Actuator, Power, Module, Display).
BLADE-SPACE Governance Node: System schematic with 91 components and 134 electrical connections, color-coded by subsystem. All critical paths hot-redundant with SpaceWire bridge voting and Latching Current Limiter trip on SEU latch-up.

National Importance

Autonomous orbital platforms - rendezvous-proximity operations spacecraft, satellite servicing systems, distributed-spacecraft constellations, and orbital defense platforms - must execute authority-gated decisions (propulsive maneuvers, payload firing, RPO maneuvers) beyond ground-loop latency. A LEO platform may have minutes between command opportunities; some maneuvers must be authorized in seconds.

The space governance problem is structurally identical to the terrestrial autonomous-weapons governance problem (DoD Directive 3000.09 "appropriate levels of human judgment") but with three additional constraints: radiation environment (Single-Event Upsets corrupt computation deterministically), thermal cycling (-40 °C to +60 °C operating), and absolute repairability (no field maintenance after launch). Software-only governance cannot meet these constraints.

The BLADE-SPACE Governance Node aligns directly with NASA SBIR 2026 Subtopic EXPAND.3.S26B (Autonomous Onboard Health Management for Small Spacecraft and Distributed Systems) and addresses the published Phase I expectation at TRL 3, with hot-redundant rad-tolerant compute, ECDSA-anchored audit chain, and three-fault-tolerant safety interlock on the payload/thruster firing path.

Research Problem

Autonomous orbital platforms operate beyond ground-loop latency yet must execute authority-gated decisions in real time. Existing approaches either delegate every decision to ground (incompatible with constellation-scale autonomy) or accept software-only governance that cannot survive SEU corruption, brown-outs, or radiation-induced compute path failures.

The BLADE-SPACE platform addresses five orbital governance gaps:

No rad-tolerant hardware governance layer for autonomous orbital authority decisions
GNSS spoofing in orbit is harder to detect than on ground (multi-constellation correlation required)
Single-string compute fails catastrophically on SEU; hot redundancy with <200 ms failover is the only viable path
Audit chain must survive brown-outs, reboots, and failover events with cryptographic hash continuity
Payload/thruster firing requires three-fault tolerance against unintended actuation (per SR-401)

This platform demonstrates that the AUTHREX authority-governance stack ports cleanly from defense (BLADE-EDGE) to the orbital domain by addressing radiation, thermal, and reliability constraints with hot-redundant rad-tolerant compute, ECDSA-anchored audit, and three-fault-tolerant safety interlocks.

Orbital Governance Extension

The BLADE-SPACE extends the authority-governance stack from terrestrial defense (BLADE-EDGE) to the orbital domain. The 9-stage pipeline is preserved; the difference is in the environmental envelope and the failure modes the hardware must tolerate.

Radiation-Tolerant Compute Path

Microchip RTG4 FPGA (part-level TID 100 krad per datasheet, SEL immune) primary + backup with lockstep voting; Aitech S-A1760 Venus SBC primary + backup with Latching Current Limiter trip on SEU latch-up; SEU monitor IP + scrubber re-loads bitstream on detected upset. System-level TID allocation is 30 krad after 3 mm Al equivalent shielding margin.

Three-Fault-Tolerant Firing Path

Payload/thruster firing line gated through two independent normally-open solid-state relays (path A and path B) that must both close to permit firing, plus pyrotechnic isolation circuit with hardwired safe-arm plug during ground handling (per SR-004, SR-401)

ECDSA-Anchored Audit Chain

P-256 keypair anchored in rad-tolerant TPM signs every audit-chain entry; hash continuity maintained across reboots, brown-outs, and failover events (SR-008); ECDSA signature throughput ≥ 100/second (SR-105)

CARA Safe-Mode Auto-Entry

On ABORT verdict, system enters automatic magnetorquer detumble + sun-pointing safe-mode (SR-007). Backup IMU (Honeywell HG1700) provides ≤ 30 min dead-reckoning if GNSS lock lost; star-tracker correction observation update

The platform demonstrates that AUTHREX governance is domain-agnostic: the same 9-stage pipeline that governs ground-based directed-energy engagement on BLADE-EDGE governs propulsive maneuvers and payload firing on BLADE-SPACE, with environmental tolerances scaled to the orbital regime.

System Overview

The BLADE-EDGE receives data from six sensor categories, processes it through a 9-stage governance pipeline on dual-redundant compute hardware, and outputs one of four decisions: EXECUTE, DELAY, ABORT, or HANDOFF.

BLADE-EDGE System Overview showing sensor inputs, compute core, and command outputs

9-stage Governance Pipeline

Every engagement decision passes through nine sequential modules targeting 50-300ms end-to-end latency. Each stage can independently trigger an ABORT, preventing downstream execution.

BLADE-EDGE 9-stage governance pipeline: SATA, HMAA, ADARA, MAIVA, FLAME, CARA

Stage 1: SATA: Sensor Trust Attestation

Computes trust scalar τ from ALL sensor inputs combined with beam-path confidence scoring. Atmospheric sensors measuring humidity, obscurants, and turbulence feed directly into trust computation because a clear sensor picture is useless if the beam cannot reach the target.

Stage 2: ADARA: Adversarial Deception-Aware Risk Assessment

GPU-accelerated anomaly detection targeting decoys, reflectivity manipulation, adversarial track shaping, GPS spoofing, and sensor-to-sensor inconsistency. Any deception flag independently triggers ABORT.

Stage 3: IFF, Identification Friend or Foe

Verifies target classification against known friendly signatures. Prevents fratricide through cryptographic IFF challenge-response before authority confirmation.

Stage 4: HMAA: Human-Machine Authority Architecture

Derives authority score A with laser-specific gating: target classification tiers, engagement authorization levels, dwell feasibility, atmospheric propagation, and thermal management before granting authority.

Stage 5: MAIVA: Multi-Agent Integrity Verification

Exchanges trust and authority values with nearby BLADE-EDGE units via encrypted MANET mesh radio. Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus ensures no single compromised node can fool the swarm.

Stage 6: FLAME: Flash War Latency Architecture

Enforces 50-300ms recheck windows before firing in ambiguous conditions. Three modes: immediate pass-through (high confidence), micro-deliberation (ambiguous), auto-handoff (engagement window exceeded).

Stage 7: CARA: Control Authority Regulation

Post-abort recovery: steps authority to zero, revalidates all sensors from scratch, re-acquires target track, feeds back to SATA for fresh trust computation. Prevents false confidence buildup from abort cycling.

Stage 8: BDA, Battle Damage Assessment

Post-engagement sensor revalidation. Confirms engagement outcome, updates target track state, and feeds back to SATA for trust recomputation before next engagement cycle.

Stage 9: EFFECTOR, Hardware Safety Interlock

Normally-open hardwired safety relay. Closes ONLY when the full 9-stage pipeline confirms authority. Physical circuit break prevents engagement without verified governance chain.

Final Decision = Pipeline Authority × β_beam

β_beam factors: atmospheric clarity, track stability, dwell feasibility,
thermal cooldown margin, collateral exclusion confidence, target class,
handoff availability

Output: EXECUTE | DELAY (ms) | ABORT | HANDOFF (effector ID)

Authority Decision Model

The BLADE-EDGE outputs one of four decisions based on pipeline authority and beam suitability. Unlike binary fire/no-fire systems, the governance model provides graduated response with automatic effector handoff.

EXECUTE

Full pipeline authority confirmed. Beam conditions favorable (β_beam > threshold). Safety interlock relay closes. Engagement authorized.

DELAY (ms)

Ambiguous conditions detected by FLAME. System holds for 50-300ms micro-deliberation, re-queries sensors, re-runs ADARA, re-checks MAIVA consensus.

ABORT

Trust collapse, deception detected, or consensus failure. Safety interlock remains open. CARA recovery initiates: authority zeroed, sensors revalidated from scratch.

HANDOFF (effector ID)

Pipeline authority confirmed but beam conditions unfavorable (atmospheric turbulence, thermal limits). Engagement transferred to kinetic interceptor via MIL-STD-1553.

The safety interlock relay is physically hardwired normally-open, the weapon literally cannot fire unless the BLADE-EDGE actively confirms full authority through all six pipeline stages. This is hardware-enforced governance, not software-only.

Sensor-Anchored Trust Assessment (SATA)

The BLADE-EDGE implements SATA trust evaluation across six sensor categories simultaneously. Each feed is independently evaluated for signal integrity, noise floor, expected pattern consistency, and cross-correlation with other sensors. The output is a single trust scalar τ ∈ [0,1].

Trust(s_i) = weighted belief function with beam-path confidence integration.
Cross-sensor validation: radar + EO/IR + LIDAR + GPS/IMU + atmospheric.
A degraded GPS signal reduces τ even if radar is strong.
Atmospheric sensors feed directly into trust computation (beam propagation feasibility).

Key innovation: beam-path confidence is integrated at the trust layer rather than post-pipeline. Atmospheric sensors measuring humidity, obscurants, and turbulence feed directly into SATA because a clear sensor picture is useless if the directed-energy beam cannot reach the target. This tight coupling between sensing and beam physics is unique to BLADE-EDGE.

Hardware Architecture: Compute, Sensors, Communications & Security

BLADE-SPACE is built on rad-tolerant hot-redundant space-grade hardware. All compute paths are dual-string with SpaceWire bridge voting and < 200 ms failover. Sensors are independently dual-sourced (star tracker, GNSS, IMU, sun sensor, magnetometer) and cross-validated through the SATA sensor trust module and ADARA multi-constellation correlation.

Compute Subsystem (FPGA + SBC Hot Redundancy)

ComponentModelQtyRole
Main Compute FPGAMicrochip RTG4 (RT4G150)1Rad-tolerant programmable logic, primary pipeline
Backup Compute FPGAMicrochip RTG4 (RT4G150)1Hot standby with SpaceWire bridge voting
Main Space SBCAitech S-A1760 Venus1Rad-tolerant PowerPC, primary application processor
Redundant Space SBCAitech S-A1760 Venus1Hot standby; LCL trip + failover < 200 ms
DDR4 ECC SDRAMRad-hard DDR4 ECC Module1Compute memory with ECC scrubbing
QSPI NOR FlashRad-hard QSPI NOR Flash1FPGA bitstream + boot
Secure Boot TPMMicrochip CEC17121Boot-chain attestation, key isolation
SpaceWire TransceiversCobham UT200SpW4Compute-to-subsystem high-speed bus

Sensor Subsystem (AOCS + Navigation + Health)

ComponentModelQtyRole
Star Tracker (Main + Redundant)Blue Canyon Technologies NST1002≤ 30 arcsec 3σ attitude knowledge (SR-102)
GNSS Receiver (Main + Redundant)NovAtel OEM7600-RG2≤ 5 m 1σ dual-fix position; ADARA spoof detection
Tactical IMU (primary)Sensonor STIM-3001≤ 0.5 °/hr bias stability (SR-104)
Backup IMUHoneywell HG1700130-min dead-reckoning during GNSS lock loss
Sun SensorsAdcole Micro Digital2Coarse attitude for safe-mode sun pointing
MagnetometersZARM 3-axis2Magnetic field reference for magnetorquer control
Radiation DosimeterRadFET / PiN-diode1TID accumulation tracking
PT1000 Thermistor ArrayCustom array1Multi-point chassis + LRU temperature monitoring
Vacuum Pressure SensorSetra Model 7121Outgassing monitoring

Communications & Security

ComponentModelQtyRole
S-band TT&C TransceiverSyrlinks EWC27 (Main + Redundant)2Ground command/telemetry; hot redundant
Optical ISL TransceiverLaser Light Communications1High-rate inter-satellite link
CAN Bus TransceiversRad-hard (Main + Redundant)2Low-rate subsystem bus
Link EncryptorMicrochip ATECC608B + AES-256-GCM FPGA IP (Main + Redundant)2RF link confidentiality + integrity
Security TPM ModuleSpace-grade Rad-tolerant TPM1ECDSA P-256 anchor for audit chain (SR-003)
Secure Boot/Key FlashMacronix MX25L Rad-tolerant1Sealed key storage
Electronic Tamper Mesh ControllerCustom ASIC/FPGA1Tamper detection alarm

Power and Redundancy Architecture

BLADE-SPACE operates on a 28V regulated spacecraft bus with EMI filter, power sequencer, Latching Current Limiter array, and three VPT DC-DC converters producing 12 V, 5 V, and 3.3 V rails. Saft VES16 8S1P Li-Ion (135 Wh) provides eclipse + safe-mode ride-through; supercapacitor bank handles thruster-firing transients. 12 hot-redundant component pairs ensure no single point of failure on critical paths.

Hot-Redundant Pairs (12)

PrimaryBackupFailover Strategy
RTG4 FPGA primaryRTG4 FPGA backupSpaceWire bridge voting + bitstream scrubber
Aitech SBC primaryAitech SBC backupLCL trip + watchdog + auto-failover < 200 ms
Star Tracker mainStar Tracker redundantFailover on CAN heartbeat loss
NovAtel GNSS mainNovAtel GNSS redundantCross-validation + ADARA spoof detection
Sensonor STIM-300 IMUHoneywell HG1700 IMUCross-validate; 30-min HG1700 dead-reckoning
Sun Sensor 1Sun Sensor 2Independent attitude estimate
Magnetometer 1Magnetometer 2Independent magnetic field estimate
Syrlinks S-band TT&C mainSyrlinks S-band TT&C redundantIndependent RF chain
CAN transceiver mainCAN transceiver redundantBus A/Bus B redundancy
Link Encryptor mainLink Encryptor redundantIndependent crypto chain
Thruster SSR path AThruster SSR path BBoth must close for firing (SR-004)
Main Li-Ion batteryRedundant Li-Ion batteryBMS-controlled isolation

Power Architecture (28V Bus)

28V Spacecraft Bus
  → EMI Filter → Power Sequencer → LCL Array
    → VPT VSC50-28S12 (28→12 V, 88% eff) → SBC, Star Tracker, Thruster SSR
    → VPT VSC50-28S5 (28→5 V, 85% eff) → GNSS, IMUs, Comms, Encryptors
    → VPT VSC30-28S3R3 (28→3.3+1.2 V, 82% eff) → FPGA core, TPM, transceivers
  Saft VES16 8S1P (135 Wh) → Eclipse + safe-mode ride-through (19.6% DoD over 5 yr)
  Supercapacitor Bank → Thruster-firing transient absorption

Power Budget Summary

ModeLoad (W)Conv. Loss (W)Bus Draw (W)Current @ 28V
Nominal cruise112.522134.54.8 A
Pipeline active + comms TX145261716.1 A
Peak (comms TX + thruster prep)165281936.9 A
Eclipse safe-mode359441.6 A

PDR margin: 34% (193 W peak vs 250 W bus allocation). Battery cycle-life budget: ~30,000 cycles @ 20% DoD over 5 years - acceptable for design life.

Three-Layer Space-Grade Security

Layer 1: Physical

Space-grade aluminum chassis with 3 mm Al equivalent shielding (30 krad TID); ASTM E595 outgassing-compliant materials (TML < 1.0%, CVCM < 0.1%); hardwired safe-arm plug for pyrotechnic isolation during ground handling.

Layer 2: Electronic

Electronic tamper mesh controller raises alarm on probe attempt; LCL trip on SEU-induced latch-up < 1 ms; hardware watchdog forces reset on hang; SEU monitor IP + scrubber re-loads FPGA bitstream on detected upset.

Layer 3: Cryptographic

ECDSA P-256 keypair anchored in rad-tolerant TPM; signs every audit-chain entry with hash continuity across reboots/brown-outs/failover (SR-003, SR-008); ≥ 100 signatures/sec throughput (SR-105); dual link encryptors for RF chain redundancy.

Bill of Materials: $505,440 (Reference Cost)

91 components consolidated from the 124-component pre-cleanup design. Cost reflects rad-tolerant and space-qualified parts at single-unit / engineering-model pricing. Full parts manifest with manufacturer, MPN, and source URLs is in the engineering package.

SubsystemMass (kg)Allocation
Compute (RTG4 ×2, Aitech ×2, memory, bridge)1.9517.7%
Sensors (star tracker, GNSS ×2, IMU ×2, sun ×2, mag ×2, dosimeter, thermistor)2.3020.9%
Communications (Syrlinks, optical ISL, antennas, transceivers, encryptors)1.3011.8%
Power (Saft VES16, DC-DCs ×3, LCL, supercaps, EMI filter)1.6014.5%
Mechanical / Thermal (chassis, radiator, LHP ×2, CCHPs, MLI, indium pads)2.2020.0%
Actuation (SSRs, drivers, relays, servos)0.504.5%
Security (TPM, secure flash, tamper mesh, crypto coprocessor)0.252.3%
Connectors / harness / 12-layer PCB0.908.2%
Dry mass total11.00100%

Reference cost of $505,440 reflects rad-tolerant and space-qualified single-unit pricing. The top three cost drivers are typically the optical ISL transceiver, the dual-redundant SBC + FPGA compute stack, and the dual-redundant TT&C transceivers. The engineering package contains the full per-line BOM CSV with manufacturers, MPNs, export-control classifications, and source URLs.

Physical & Environmental Specifications

Form Factor6U+ SmallSat payload module
Mass (est. / target)11.0 kg / 12.0 kg
Power (nominal / peak)134 W / 193 W
Bus Voltage28V regulated
OrbitLEO 400-1200 km
Mission Life5 yr design / 7 yr stretch
Radiation TID30 krad behind 3 mm Al
Temperature (op / surv)-40 to +60 / -55 to +85 °C
VibrationGEVS-type random
Shock1000 g half-sine pyro
OutgassingTML < 1.0%, CVCM < 0.1%
ReliabilityR_system = 0.949 @ 5 yr

System Schematic

91 components, 134 electrical connections (53 power + 81 data), 117 mechanical connections. All critical paths hot-redundant with SpaceWire bridge voting and Latching Current Limiter trip on SEU latch-up.

BLADE-SPACE Governance Node 3D render: octagonal space-grade aluminum chassis with visible internal PCBs through inspection window, multiple chips and modules, side-mounted heat sinks for radiative thermal management, mounted on hexagonal interface base.
View Full Schematic (PDF) ↓

Governance Simulation

The accompanying browser-based simulation implements the 9-stage governance pipeline (SATA → ADARA → IFF → HMAA → MAIVA → FLAME → CARA → BDA → EFFECTOR) with adversarial scenarios including GNSS spoofing, SEU compute upset, sensor degradation, and consensus-fault injection. The simulator executes the actual pipeline algorithms specified in the Preliminary Design data package.

Scenarios Available

  • Nominal propulsive maneuver authorization (baseline)
  • GNSS spoofing under ADARA cross-correlation
  • SEU-induced FPGA compute path failover
  • Star tracker occlusion and IMU dead-reckoning fallback
  • CARA safe-mode auto-entry on ABORT verdict
  • Audit-chain hash continuity across simulated brown-out
Launch BLADE-SPACE Simulator

Role in the Governance Stack

The BLADE-EDGE Governance Node represents the defense-grade implementation of the authority-governed autonomy framework. All seven governance architectures (SATA, HMAA, ADARA, MAIVA, FLAME, CARA, ERAM) are specified for hardware implementation within this platform design, extending the research from simulation to a detailed reference architecture (TRL 2-3) intended for testbed-grade implementation in contested-environment scenarios.

Related platforms: Rover Testbed (~$484) · UAV Platform (~$4,200) · BLADE-EDGE (defense, ~$139K) · BLADE-AV (automotive, ~$16K) · BLADE-MARITIME (maritime, ~$43K) · BLADE-INFRA (infrastructure, ~$12K) · BLADE-AGENT-HSM (agentic AI, ~$199). Nine platforms demonstrating governance stack portability across seven domains (including the orbital BLADE-SPACE Preliminary Design, TRL 2-3).

Validation Metrics

91
Hardware components specified
134
Electrical connections (53 P + 81 D)
9
Governance pipeline stages
117
Mechanical connections defined
12
Hot-redundant component pairs
6
Sensor categories fused

Verification & Validation Plan

The BLADE-SPACE V&V Plan specifies a 20-test verification campaign with pass/fail criteria, equipment lists, and method per test. The plan covers functional, performance, environmental, reliability, and safety requirements from the SRD.

Functional Tests

  • T-002: Payload-firing path safety interlock (FMEA F-009)
  • T-004: SBC primary-to-backup failover < 200 ms
  • T-005: ECDSA audit-chain hash continuity across reboots
  • T-007: GNSS spoofing via multi-constellation correlation
  • T-008: End-to-end 9-stage pipeline latency ≤ 300 ms

Performance Tests

  • T-006: Star tracker ≤ 30 arcsec 3σ / GNSS ≤ 5 m 1σ / IMU ≤ 0.5 °/hr
  • T-005: ECDSA throughput ≥ 100 signatures/sec

Environmental Tests

  • T-010: Operating temperature -40 to +60 °C
  • T-011: Survival temperature -55 to +85 °C
  • T-012: GEVS-type random vibration (3 axes)
  • T-013: 1000 g half-sine pyro shock (3 axes)
  • T-017: ASTM E595 outgassing
  • T-018: 30 krad TID

Risk Analysis

  • FMEA: 35 failure modes (7 catastrophic, 4 mitigated by redundancy)
  • Hazard Analysis: 10 hazards (3 critical with three-fault-tolerant mitigations)
  • Reliability: R_system = 0.949 at 5-year EOL with CIL closure
  • Radiation: 30 krad TID, per-part SEU/SEE classification

Three open Critical Items List entries (DC-DC single-string failures) require redundant converter addition before Critical Design Review. Vibration/TVAC/EMC qualification reports do not yet exist; V&V Plan specifies the campaign that will produce them.

Project Status: Preliminary Design Phase (TRL 2-3)

System Requirements Document (25 traceable SRs)
Requirements Traceability Matrix complete
91-component BOM with manufacturers + MPN + cost
134 electrical + 117 mechanical connections
Power budget: 134 W nominal, 193 W peak, 34% PDR margin
Mass budget: 11.0 kg / 12.0 kg allocation, 15% margin
Thermal analysis (radiator sizing, hot/cold-case)
FMEA (35 failure modes) + Hazard Analysis (10 hazards)
V&V Plan (20-test campaign specified)
3 fully specified ICDs (ICD-001/002/003)
ICD-004 through ICD-011: outline only, full pin-table pending
Thermal Math Model: node inputs specified, ESATAN-TMS pending
3 Critical Items List entries (DC-DC) require redundant converter add
Vibration / TVAC / EMC qualification reports: not yet executed
Honest assessment: This is a Preliminary Design Phase data package suitable for sponsor briefing, SBIR Phase I proposal supporting evidence, university capstone review, and early concept-review at a research program manager level. It is not yet flight-build documentation. The package explicitly identifies what is complete versus what is scoped for the next revision (Critical Design Review).

Engineering Package

Complete BLADE-SPACE Governance Node Preliminary Design Phase data package (15 engineering design documents). All files are original work by Burak Oktenli (Georgetown University, M.P.S. Applied Intelligence).

Complete Engineering Package (ZIP) - 15 documents + schematic SVG + parts CSV + JSON configs Interactive Governance Simulator (HTML, 269 KB) Full System Schematic (PDF, 3-page) Bill of Materials (CSV, 91 components)

Reproducible Research Artifacts

This project provides complete reproducible artifacts enabling independent verification of the system design, component selection, and governance architecture.

System Design

Full schematic SVG (200 KB), CONFIG.json master configuration, ELECTRICAL_CONNECTIONS.json (134 connections), MECHANICAL_CONNECTIONS.json (117 attachments), all originals in the engineering package.

Bill of Materials

91-component PARTS.csv with manufacturer, MPN, description, export-control classification, cost, and source URL. Open the file in any spreadsheet tool; values reproduce the BOM table on this page.

V&V Protocol

VV_PLAN.md specifies the 20-test campaign with pass/fail criteria, equipment lists, and method per test. RTM.md links every SRD requirement to the test that verifies it.

Standards Alignment

DoDD 3000.09 (autonomy authority), NASA SBIR EXPAND.3.S26B (spacecraft health management), GEVS vibration, ASTM E595 outgassing, NIST AI RMF.

Future Work · Path from TRL 2-3 to TRL 6+

The BLADE-SPACE Preliminary Design represents TRL 2-3. The roadmap below progresses through Critical Design Review (TRL 4), engineering-model fabrication (TRL 5), relevant-environment qualification (TRL 6), and operational infusion paths aligned with active U.S. Government programs. Each milestone is mapped to a specific funding vehicle or research initiative where the design is positioned to compete.

Phase 1 · 0-12 months: Documentation Hardening & SBIR Phase I

NASA SBIR Phase I (EXPAND.3.S26B)

Submit Phase I proposal to EXPAND.3.S26B - Autonomous Onboard Health Management for Small Spacecraft and Distributed Systems under the NASA SBIR/STTR Program Year 2026 BAA (released 17 April 2026, valid through 30 September 2027). The subtopic explicitly accepts terrestrial Earth-analog testbed demonstrations in Phase I, with Phase II advancing to flight-hardware validation and Phase III to operational infusion. BLADE-SPACE's 9-stage governance pipeline maps directly to the subtopic's call for "continuous on-board health management capabilities to detect anomalies, diagnose, isolate" faults - particularly the unknown-fault response requirement (up to 40% of failure modes go unidentified through Key Decision Point E).

CDR Closeout Documentation (TRL 4 entry)

Surface the 11 Interface Control Documents publicly (currently in ZIP only); add Requirements Traceability Matrix excerpt; declare NASA-STD-8739.8 software safety class (Class B target for firing-path firmware); add NASA-STD-8719.27 lithium-battery hazard analysis for Saft VES16; build ESATAN-TMS network thermal model with worst-hot / worst-cold orbital cases; publish AP9/AE9 or SPENVIS orbit-environment run output backing the 30 krad TID system-level allocation; add ITAR USML Category XV(e) export-control flag on documentation cover.

Phase 2 · 12-24 months: Engineering Model Build & Run-Time Assurance Integration

Custom 12-Layer PCB & Component Procurement

Class V QML / Class S parts procurement (12-18 month lead time for rad-hard T2080 and RTG4); flight-harness fabrication per NASA-STD-8739.4; ESD-controlled clean-room assembly per ISO 14644 Class 8. Engineering Model build with single-string electrical functional validation, then assembly to flight-hardware-equivalent (FHE) configuration with full hot-redundant pairs.

AFRL STARS Run-Time Assurance Integration

Integrate the AUTHREX 9-stage authority pipeline with AFRL's STARS (Safe Trusted Autonomy for Responsible Spacecraft) Run-Time Assurance framework (an AFRL Seedlings for Disruptive Capabilities program). This is a proposed research-alignment target; no affiliation, sponsorship, or funding relationship exists. Map the HMAA authority-graduation model onto the published STARL (Space Trusted Autonomy Readiness Levels) scale. The HMAA hardware-enforced authority gating is complementary to STARS RTA safety-filtering and provides the physical-layer enforcement that RTA assumes but does not implement.

Phase 3 · 24-36 months: Qualification Campaign & Relevant Environment (TRL 5-6)

Environmental Qualification (GEVS / MIL-STD-1540E)

Vibration to GSFC-STD-7000A GEVS qualification levels (14.1 g_rms random, 5 minutes/axis); 1000 g half-sine pyrotechnic shock per MIL-STD-810G Method 516.7; TVAC across -55°C to +85°C at <10⁻⁵ Torr; ASTM E595 outgassing (TML <1.0%, CVCM <0.1%); MIL-STD-461G EMC against CE102 / CS101 / RE102 / RS103 / CS114; helium leak per pressurized vessel applicable items.

Heavy-Ion SEU Characterization

Single-event characterization at TAMU Cyclotron Institute or LBNL 88-Inch Cyclotron over LET 0.5-80 MeV·cm²/mg per JESD57. Measure FPGA configuration upset cross-section, SBC latch-up threshold, DDR4 ECC scrub margin. Validate the 100 krad part-level / 30 krad system-level TID allocation through Co-60 gamma ray test at AFRL or DTRA-approved facility.

Phase 4 · 36+ months: Operational Infusion Pathways (TRL 7+)

USSF Tetra-5 / On-Orbit Servicing Demonstrations

Align with the four 2026-2028 on-orbit servicing demonstrations: USSF/AFRL Tetra-5 (autonomous RPO + docking + inspection + refueling), Astroscale U.S. Provisioner (GEO hydrazine refueling, USSF SSC), SpaceLogistics MRV (Northrop Grumman, NRL robotic arm, DARPA-funded RSGS), and Astroscale ELSA-M (multi-client servicing/debris removal). Each demonstration requires hardware-enforced authority gating for proximity-operations maneuvers; BLADE-SPACE provides exactly that governance layer.

DARPA Oversight Constellation Custody

Position the MAIVA cross-string Byzantine consensus layer for integration with DARPA Oversight - autonomous constant custody of up to 1,000 targets with operator at aggregate level, not per-target. The BDA stage's post-event trust revalidation provides the "continual assurance" framework that DARPA Assured Autonomy specifies for Learning-Enabled Cyber-Physical Systems. Submit white-paper response to next Oversight BAA opening.

USSF Maneuverable GEO + Race to Resilience

Position as the governance layer for the USSF Maneuverable GEO program (competition opened January 2026) and the broader USSF Race to Resilience initiative (FY2026 Space Force baseline appropriation $26.3B, approaching $40B with reconciliation funding via the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act"). Small / medium maneuverable commercial satellites in GEO require authority-graduated decision-making for autonomous orbit changes - the HMAA + FLAME + CARA stack is positioned for direct integration.

Distributed Constellation Demonstration

Multi-node MAIVA Byzantine consensus across N≥3 BLADE-SPACE governance nodes over inter-satellite optical link (Mynaric CONDOR Mk3); cross-satellite audit-chain hash continuity via ECDSA P-256 chain-of-trust; demonstrate authority-graduated decision-making across a constellation with degraded-node ride-through, swarm continuity under one-node-loss, and cross-satellite health exchange - all four primary capabilities called out in EXPAND.3.S26B.

Honest Risk Disclosure

This roadmap is contingent on funding, partnership, and procurement-pathway availability. Realistic flight-build cost (parts + AI&T NRE + flight qualification) for a 91-component rad-tolerant Class V LEO node is in the $1.5M-$2.5M range, not the $505,440 parts-only reference BOM. ITAR USML Category XV applies to multiple line items and constrains foreign-collaboration pathways. The 12-18 month lead times on Class V rad-hard parts (RTG4, Aitech S-A1760 Venus) drive Phase 2 timing. No NASA, USSF, or DARPA endorsement of BLADE-SPACE is claimed or implied; programs cited are real and current as of May 2026 and represent targeted submission vehicles, not awarded contracts.

SDK Integration

The BLADE Governance SDK provides a unified API across all seven BLADE domains. The same blade_governance library drives defense weapons governance (BLADE-EDGE), autonomous vehicle authority (BLADE-AV), maritime surveillance (BLADE-MARITIME), critical infrastructure protection (BLADE-INFRA), orbital autonomy (BLADE-SPACE), and counter-UAS authority (BLADE-CUAS). Only the domain configuration file changes.

blade_space.yaml Orbital (Space-Edge)
domain: orbital
pipeline: SATA → ADARA → IFF → HMAA → MAIVA → FLAME → CARA → BDA → EFFECTOR

sensors:
 - id: star_tracker
 type: blue_canyon_nst100
 weight: 0.35
 cross_validate: [gnss, imu_tactical]
 - id: gnss
 type: novatel_oem7600_rg
 weight: 0.25
 cross_validate: [star_tracker, imu_tactical]
 - id: imu_tactical
 type: sensonor_stim_300
 weight: 0.25
 cross_validate: [star_tracker, gnss]
 - id: sun_sensor
 type: adcole_digital_array
 weight: 0.15
 cross_validate: [star_tracker]

effector:
 type: thruster_firing + magnetorquer + reaction_wheel
 relay: normally_open_interlock_x2_series
 safety_standard: NASA_STD_5017 + NASA_STD_8719_27
 engagement_gate: HMAA_authority + safe_arm_plug
 fail_safe: sun_pointing_safe_mode

authority:
 A3_threshold: 0.85 # Propulsive maneuver authorized
 A2_threshold: 0.60 # Reaction wheel only, no thruster
 A1_threshold: 0.35 # Attitude hold, no maneuvers
 A0_action: safe_mode # NO relays open, payload off
 hysteresis_up_s: 30 # Long climb (eclipse-aware)
 hysteresis_down_s: 0 # Immediate downgrade
integration_example.py Python
import blade_governance as bg

# Initialize with orbital domain config
pipeline = bg.GovernancePipeline("blade_space.yaml")

# In your spacecraft ACS/payload control loop (10Hz):
while mission_active:
 sensors = get_sensor_readings() # ST, GNSS, IMU, sun

 result = pipeline.evaluate(sensors)
 # result.trust → 0.91
 # result.authority → "A3"
 # result.deception_p → 0.02
 # result.flame_hold_ms → 5000 # deliberation
 # result.execute → True

 if result.execute and result.authority == "A3":
 thruster.fire(result.envelope) # gated through 2× NO relays
 elif result.authority == "A0":
 pipeline.cara_recover() # sun-pointing safe-mode
ROS 2 Topic Map
# ROS 2 Topic Map, Orbital
/blade/sata/fused_trust # Float64 τ ∈ [0,1]
/blade/hmaa/authority_level # UInt8 {A3,A2,A1,A0}
/blade/hmaa/maneuver_envelope # ManeuverMsg
/blade/flame/circuit_breaker # UInt8 state
/blade/flame/deliberation_ms # UInt32 hold time
/blade/cara/grep_phase # String {GUARD,REDUCE,EVALUATE,PROMOTE}
/blade/effector/thruster_interlock # Bool (NO relay × 2 state)
/blade/adara/gnss_spoof_prob # Float64 P(spoofing)
/blade/bda/orbit_revalidation # OrbitRevalidation
Unified API Surface SAME ACROSS ALL 5 DOMAINS
# Core API, domain-agnostic
pipeline = bg.GovernancePipeline(config)
result = pipeline.evaluate(sensors)
recovery = pipeline.cara_recover()

# result object, universal fields
result.trust # Float64 τ ∈ [0,1]
result.authority # String {A3,A2,A1,A0}
result.deception_p # Float64 P(adversarial)
result.flame_hold_ms # UInt32 deliberation window
result.execute # Bool action permitted
result.relay_state # Bool hardware interlock
result.grep_phase # String CARA state

# Lifecycle
pipeline.get_audit_chain() # Hash-chained log
pipeline.export_forensics() # BLADE-BLACKBOX
pipeline.get_config() # Current domain cfg

Cross-Domain Portability: The blade_governance SDK uses the same evaluate()result API across all seven domains. Switching from orbital governance (BLADE-SPACE) to defense weapons authority (BLADE-EDGE) or any of the five requires changing only the YAML configuration file, not the application code. This is how the same governance pipeline operates under NASA-STD-5017 / NASA-STD-8739.8 / ECSS-Q-ST-30C (orbital), DoDD 3000.09 / MIL-STD-810G (defense), ISO 26262 ASIL-D (automotive), IMO MSC.1/Circ.1455 (maritime), and SIL 3 / NERC CIP (critical infrastructure) simultaneously, each with its domain-specific config.

About This Project

The BLADE-SPACE Governance Node is part of the authority-governed autonomy research program by Burak Oktenli at Georgetown University (M.P.S. Applied Intelligence). It demonstrates mastery across 12 technical domains: radiation-tolerant FPGA design (Microchip RTG4), space-qualified compute architecture (Aitech S-A1760 Venus SBC), multi-sensor fusion under orbital conditions, NASA/ECSS standards compliance, hardware security architecture (TPM 2.0 + ECDSA P-256 secure boot), distributed consensus with SpaceWire cross-string voting, thermal-vacuum design, space power systems engineering (28V bus, eclipse-aware battery management), TID/SEU/SEL radiation hardening, real-time flight software (bare-metal RTOS), autonomous systems ethics in orbital contexts, and three-fault-tolerant safety interlock architecture for propulsive maneuvers and payload firing.

Related research architectures: SATA (sensor trust), HMAA (authority computation), CARA (recovery), MAIVA (multi-agent trust), FLAME (latency control), ADARA (deception-aware risk).

Companion BLADE hardware platforms: BLADE-EDGE (defense), BLADE-AV (automotive), BLADE-MARITIME (maritime), BLADE-INFRA (critical infrastructure). BLADE-SPACE (orbital) is the fifth domain instantiation of the AUTHREX governance stack.

View full research portfolio →