BLADE-SPACE = Beam-Layer Authority for Directed Engagements, Space-Edge Node
A reference design (design package and bill of materials; not built) for a radiation-tolerant, hot-redundant orbital governance node, intended to serve as the ethical decision-making authority for autonomous LEO platforms by determining in real time whether systems should EXECUTE, DELAY, ABORT, or enter CARA safe-mode based on multi-sensor trust consensus, beyond ground-loop latency. Radiation tolerance is a design target (30 krad TID allocation; not tested).
Preliminary Design Phase (TRL 2-3) · 15-Document Engineering Package · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20183269This is NOT a weapon. It is a governance layer, specified as a radiation-tolerant, hot-redundant, hardware-enforced ethical checkpoint between autonomous orbital platforms and authority-gated actions (propulsive maneuvers, payload firing, rendezvous-proximity operations). DoD Directive 3000.09 requires that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force; this design adapts that human-judgment principle to spacecraft actions beyond ground-loop latency.
Engineering Package: 15 engineering design documents in blade-space-repo.zip - System Requirements Document (25 traceable requirements), Requirements Traceability Matrix, FMEA (35 failure modes, 7 catastrophic), Hazard Analysis (10 hazards, 3 critical with three-fault-tolerant mitigations), V&V Plan (20-test campaign), Power / Mass / Thermal Budgets, 11 Interface Control Documents, Reliability Analysis, Radiation Analysis (30 krad TID, SEU/SEE), Assembly & Integration Plan, Configuration Management Plan. Published on Zenodo: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20183269.
Autonomous orbital platforms - rendezvous-proximity operations spacecraft, satellite servicing systems, distributed-spacecraft constellations, and orbital defense platforms - must execute authority-gated decisions (propulsive maneuvers, payload firing, RPO maneuvers) beyond ground-loop latency. A LEO platform may have minutes between command opportunities; some maneuvers must be authorized in seconds.
The space governance problem is structurally identical to the terrestrial autonomous-weapons governance problem (DoD Directive 3000.09 "appropriate levels of human judgment") but with three additional constraints: radiation environment (Single-Event Upsets corrupt computation deterministically), thermal cycling (-40 °C to +60 °C operating), and absolute repairability (no field maintenance after launch). The design premise of this work is that software-only governance cannot meet these constraints on its own.
The BLADE-SPACE Governance Node aligns directly with NASA SBIR 2026 Subtopic EXPAND.3.S26B (Autonomous Onboard Health Management for Small Spacecraft and Distributed Systems) and addresses the published Phase I expectation at TRL 3, with hot-redundant rad-tolerant compute, ECDSA-anchored audit chain, and three-fault-tolerant safety interlock on the payload/thruster firing path.
Autonomous orbital platforms operate beyond ground-loop latency yet must execute authority-gated decisions in real time. The approaches identified in the standards and literature reviewed for this work either delegate every decision to ground (incompatible with constellation-scale autonomy) or accept software-only governance that is vulnerable to SEU corruption, brown-outs, or radiation-induced compute path failures.
The BLADE-SPACE platform addresses five orbital governance gaps:
This reference design is intended to show, at design and simulation level only, that the AUTHREX authority-governance stack can be carried from defense (BLADE-EDGE) to the orbital domain by addressing radiation, thermal, and reliability constraints with hot-redundant rad-tolerant compute, ECDSA-anchored audit, and three-fault-tolerant safety interlocks (specified; not built or tested).
The BLADE-SPACE extends the authority-governance stack from terrestrial defense (BLADE-EDGE) to the orbital domain. The 9-stage pipeline is preserved; the difference is in the environmental envelope and the failure modes the hardware must tolerate.
Microchip RTG4 FPGA (part-level TID 100 krad per datasheet, SEL immune) primary + backup with lockstep voting; Aitech S-A1760 Venus SBC primary + backup with Latching Current Limiter trip on SEU latch-up; SEU monitor IP + scrubber re-loads bitstream on detected upset. System-level TID allocation is 30 krad after 3 mm Al equivalent shielding margin.
Payload/thruster firing line gated through two independent normally-open solid-state relays (path A and path B) that must both close to permit firing, plus pyrotechnic isolation circuit with hardwired safe-arm plug during ground handling (per SR-004, SR-401)
P-256 keypair anchored in rad-tolerant TPM signs every audit-chain entry; hash continuity maintained across reboots, brown-outs, and failover events (SR-008); ECDSA signature throughput ≥ 100/second (SR-105)
On ABORT verdict, system enters automatic magnetorquer detumble + sun-pointing safe-mode (SR-007). Backup IMU (Honeywell HG1700) provides ≤ 30 min dead-reckoning if GNSS lock lost; star-tracker correction observation update
The reference design is intended to show, at design and simulation level only, that AUTHREX governance is domain-agnostic: the same 9-stage pipeline specified for ground-based directed-energy engagement in the BLADE-EDGE reference design is specified here for propulsive maneuvers and payload firing, with environmental tolerances scaled to the orbital regime.
In the reference design, BLADE-SPACE receives data from its dual-sourced attitude and navigation sensors (star trackers, GNSS receivers, tactical and backup IMUs, sun sensors and magnetometers) and its health sensors (radiation dosimeter, thermistor array and vacuum pressure sensor), processes it through a 9-stage governance pipeline specified for hot-redundant rad-tolerant compute (Microchip RTG4 FPGA and Aitech S-A1760 Venus SBC, each primary and backup), and outputs one of four decisions for an authority-gated action: EXECUTE, DELAY, ABORT, or CARA safe-mode. The design has not been built.
In the design, every authority-gated action (propulsive maneuver, payload firing, rendezvous-proximity operation) passes through nine sequential stages, with an end-to-end latency target of 300 ms or less (V&V test T-008). Each stage can independently trigger an ABORT, preventing downstream execution.
Specified to compute a trust scalar τ by Dempster-Shafer fusion over the star tracker, GNSS, IMU, sun sensor and magnetometer trust channels, cross-checking each sensor against the others.
Specified as multi-constellation GNSS spoofing detection (GPS, Galileo and GLONASS cross-check across the primary and backup NovAtel OEM7600-RG receivers) and telemetry anomaly pattern matching.
In BLADE-SPACE this stage is specified as ground-station command authentication: ECDSA P-256 verification of CCSDS authenticated telecommand frames before authority confirmation.
Specified to derive trust-proportional authority over effector commands (thruster firing, magnetorquer torque, reaction wheels, payload activation), stepping down from propulsive-maneuver authority to reaction-wheel-only operation, attitude hold, and safe-mode as trust falls.
Specified as cross-string consensus between the main and redundant compute paths, with SpaceWire bridge voting and a divergence-detection target under 200 ms. The consensus is intended to bound the influence of a faulty or compromised string; this is not asserted as a guarantee while the MAIVA CriticalSafe invariant remains open.
Specified to impose a mandatory deliberation window before propulsive maneuvers and payload firing (configurable hold period, default 5 s), so that a ground operator can confirm or veto when the link is available.
Specified safe-state enforcement on hardware fault or ABORT verdict: magnetorquer detumble and sun-pointing safe-mode, low-power operation and deselected effector commands (SR-007), with CCSDS event logging.
Specified post-event trust revalidation and orbit-determination refresh after a maneuver completes, feeding back to SATA before the next authority-gated action.
Specified as a three-fault-tolerant hardware safety interlock: two independent normally-open solid-state relays (paths A and B) that must both close to permit firing, plus pyrotechnic isolation with a hardwired ARM/SAFE plug (SR-004, SR-401). The interlock is designed to close only when the full 9-stage pipeline confirms authority.
In the design, BLADE-SPACE outputs one of four decisions based on pipeline authority. Instead of a binary go/no-go, the governance model provides a graduated response, with automatic CARA safe-mode entry on ABORT.
Full pipeline authority confirmed. Both firing-path relays (paths A and B) close and the propulsive maneuver or payload firing is permitted.
Ambiguous conditions detected by FLAME. The design holds the action for the configured deliberation window (default 5 s), re-queries sensors, re-runs ADARA, and re-checks MAIVA cross-string consensus.
Trust collapse, deception detected, or cross-string consensus failure. The firing-path relays remain open and CARA safe-mode entry begins.
On a hardware fault, or after an ABORT verdict, the design enters automatic magnetorquer detumble and sun-pointing safe-mode (SR-007); the backup IMU (Honeywell HG1700) provides up to 30 minutes of dead-reckoning if GNSS lock is lost.
The payload and thruster firing line is specified with hardwired normally-open relays and is designed so that firing is not possible unless the pipeline confirms full authority through all nine stages. This is a design property of an unbuilt reference design, intended as hardware-enforced governance rather than software-only; it has not been tested.
The BLADE-SPACE design specifies SATA trust evaluation across its dual-sourced attitude and navigation sensors (star trackers, GNSS receivers, IMUs, sun sensors and magnetometers). Each feed is evaluated for signal integrity, noise floor, expected pattern consistency, and cross-correlation with the other sensors. The output is a single trust scalar τ ∈ [0,1].
Trust(s_i) = Dempster-Shafer fusion over the sensor trust channels.
Cross-sensor validation: star tracker + GNSS + IMU + sun sensor + magnetometer.
A GNSS fix that disagrees with the star tracker and IMU reduces τ.
ADARA cross-checks GNSS across constellations (GPS, Galileo, GLONASS) for spoofing.
In the orbital design, multi-constellation GNSS cross-correlation is coupled to the trust layer because GNSS spoofing in orbit is harder to detect than on the ground (see Research Problem above).
The BLADE-SPACE reference design (not built) specifies rad-tolerant, hot-redundant space-grade hardware. All compute paths are specified as dual-string with SpaceWire bridge voting and a < 200 ms failover target. Sensors are independently dual-sourced (star tracker, GNSS, IMU, sun sensor, magnetometer) and cross-checked through the SATA sensor trust module and ADARA multi-constellation correlation.
| Component | Model | Qty | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Main Compute FPGA | Microchip RTG4 (RT4G150) | 1 | Rad-tolerant programmable logic, primary pipeline |
| Backup Compute FPGA | Microchip RTG4 (RT4G150) | 1 | Hot standby with SpaceWire bridge voting |
| Main Space SBC | Aitech S-A1760 Venus | 1 | Rad-tolerant PowerPC, primary application processor |
| Redundant Space SBC | Aitech S-A1760 Venus | 1 | Hot standby; LCL trip + failover < 200 ms |
| DDR4 ECC SDRAM | Rad-hard DDR4 ECC Module | 1 | Compute memory with ECC scrubbing |
| QSPI NOR Flash | Rad-hard QSPI NOR Flash | 1 | FPGA bitstream + boot |
| Secure Boot TPM | Microchip CEC1712 | 1 | Boot-chain attestation, key isolation |
| SpaceWire Transceivers | Cobham UT200SpW | 4 | Compute-to-subsystem high-speed bus |
| Component | Model | Qty | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Star Tracker (Main + Redundant) | Blue Canyon Technologies NST100 | 2 | ≤ 30 arcsec 3σ attitude knowledge (SR-102) |
| GNSS Receiver (Main + Redundant) | NovAtel OEM7600-RG | 2 | ≤ 5 m 1σ dual-fix position; ADARA spoof detection |
| Tactical IMU (primary) | Sensonor STIM-300 | 1 | ≤ 0.5 °/hr bias stability (SR-104) |
| Backup IMU | Honeywell HG1700 | 1 | 30-min dead-reckoning during GNSS lock loss |
| Sun Sensors | Adcole Micro Digital | 2 | Coarse attitude for safe-mode sun pointing |
| Magnetometers | ZARM 3-axis | 2 | Magnetic field reference for magnetorquer control |
| Radiation Dosimeter | RadFET / PiN-diode | 1 | TID accumulation tracking |
| PT1000 Thermistor Array | Custom array | 1 | Multi-point chassis + LRU temperature monitoring |
| Vacuum Pressure Sensor | Setra Model 712 | 1 | Outgassing monitoring |
| Component | Model | Qty | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| S-band TT&C Transceiver | Syrlinks EWC27 (Main + Redundant) | 2 | Ground command/telemetry; hot redundant |
| Optical ISL Transceiver | Laser Light Communications | 1 | High-rate inter-satellite link |
| CAN Bus Transceivers | Rad-hard (Main + Redundant) | 2 | Low-rate subsystem bus |
| Link Encryptor | Microchip ATECC608B + AES-256-GCM FPGA IP (Main + Redundant) | 2 | RF link confidentiality + integrity |
| Security TPM Module | Space-grade Rad-tolerant TPM | 1 | ECDSA P-256 anchor for audit chain (SR-003) |
| Secure Boot/Key Flash | Macronix MX25L Rad-tolerant | 1 | Sealed key storage |
| Electronic Tamper Mesh Controller | Custom ASIC/FPGA | 1 | Tamper detection alarm |
The BLADE-SPACE design specifies a 28V regulated spacecraft bus with EMI filter, power sequencer, Latching Current Limiter array, and three VPT DC-DC converters producing 12 V, 5 V, and 3.3 V rails. Saft VES16 8S1P Li-Ion (135 Wh) provides eclipse + safe-mode ride-through; supercapacitor bank handles thruster-firing transients. 12 hot-redundant component pairs are specified to avoid single points of failure on critical paths; three open Critical Items List entries (DC-DC single-string failures) remain to be closed before Critical Design Review.
| Primary | Backup | Failover Strategy |
|---|---|---|
| RTG4 FPGA primary | RTG4 FPGA backup | SpaceWire bridge voting + bitstream scrubber |
| Aitech SBC primary | Aitech SBC backup | LCL trip + watchdog + auto-failover < 200 ms |
| Star Tracker main | Star Tracker redundant | Failover on CAN heartbeat loss |
| NovAtel GNSS main | NovAtel GNSS redundant | Cross-validation + ADARA spoof detection |
| Sensonor STIM-300 IMU | Honeywell HG1700 IMU | Cross-validate; 30-min HG1700 dead-reckoning |
| Sun Sensor 1 | Sun Sensor 2 | Independent attitude estimate |
| Magnetometer 1 | Magnetometer 2 | Independent magnetic field estimate |
| Syrlinks S-band TT&C main | Syrlinks S-band TT&C redundant | Independent RF chain |
| CAN transceiver main | CAN transceiver redundant | Bus A/Bus B redundancy |
| Link Encryptor main | Link Encryptor redundant | Independent crypto chain |
| Thruster SSR path A | Thruster SSR path B | Both must close for firing (SR-004) |
| Main Li-Ion battery | Redundant Li-Ion battery | BMS-controlled isolation |
| Mode | Load (W) | Conv. Loss (W) | Bus Draw (W) | Current @ 28V |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nominal cruise | 112.5 | 22 | 134.5 | 4.8 A |
| Pipeline active + comms TX | 145 | 26 | 171 | 6.1 A |
| Peak (comms TX + thruster prep) | 165 | 28 | 193 | 6.9 A |
| Eclipse safe-mode | 35 | 9 | 44 | 1.6 A |
PDR margin: 34% (193 W peak vs 250 W bus allocation). Battery cycle-life budget: ~30,000 cycles @ 20% DoD over 5 years - acceptable for design life.
Space-grade aluminum chassis with 3 mm Al equivalent shielding (30 krad TID); ASTM E595 outgassing-compliant materials (TML < 1.0%, CVCM < 0.1%); hardwired safe-arm plug for pyrotechnic isolation during ground handling.
Electronic tamper mesh controller raises alarm on probe attempt; LCL trip on SEU-induced latch-up < 1 ms; hardware watchdog forces reset on hang; SEU monitor IP + scrubber re-loads FPGA bitstream on detected upset.
ECDSA P-256 keypair anchored in rad-tolerant TPM; signs every audit-chain entry with hash continuity across reboots/brown-outs/failover (SR-003, SR-008); ≥ 100 signatures/sec throughput (SR-105); dual link encryptors for RF chain redundancy.
91 components consolidated from the 124-component pre-cleanup design. Cost reflects rad-tolerant parts at single-unit / engineering-model pricing. Full parts manifest with manufacturer, MPN, and source URLs is in the engineering package.
| Subsystem | Mass (kg) | Allocation |
|---|---|---|
| Compute (RTG4 ×2, Aitech ×2, memory, bridge) | 1.95 | 17.7% |
| Sensors (star tracker, GNSS ×2, IMU ×2, sun ×2, mag ×2, dosimeter, thermistor) | 2.30 | 20.9% |
| Communications (Syrlinks, optical ISL, antennas, transceivers, encryptors) | 1.30 | 11.8% |
| Power (Saft VES16, DC-DCs ×3, LCL, supercaps, EMI filter) | 1.60 | 14.5% |
| Mechanical / Thermal (chassis, radiator, LHP ×2, CCHPs, MLI, indium pads) | 2.20 | 20.0% |
| Actuation (SSRs, drivers, relays, servos) | 0.50 | 4.5% |
| Security (TPM, secure flash, tamper mesh, crypto coprocessor) | 0.25 | 2.3% |
| Connectors / harness / 12-layer PCB | 0.90 | 8.2% |
| Dry mass total | 11.00 | 100% |
Reference cost of $505,440 reflects rad-tolerant single-unit part pricing. The top three cost drivers are typically the optical ISL transceiver, the dual-redundant SBC + FPGA compute stack, and the dual-redundant TT&C transceivers. The engineering package contains the full per-line BOM CSV with manufacturers, MPNs, export-control classifications, and source URLs.
91 components, 134 electrical connections (53 power + 81 data), 117 mechanical connections. All critical paths are specified as hot-redundant with SpaceWire bridge voting and Latching Current Limiter trip on SEU latch-up. The image below is a reference render of the design; no hardware has been built.
The accompanying browser-based simulation (SAP-INT v3, a companion to the Space Authority Protocol manuscript) demonstrates a related seven-stage orbital authority pipeline (SATA → ADARA → MAIVA → FLAME → CARA → HMAA → ERAM) over six orbital scenarios, with fault injection for sensor loss, communications dropout, GPS spoofing and Byzantine nodes. It does not model the IFF, BDA or EFFECTOR stages or the RTG4 and Aitech SBC hardware of this reference design, and it uses synthetic parameters that are not calibrated against hardware.
The BLADE-SPACE Governance Node is the orbital reference design (design package and bill of materials; not built) of the authority-governed autonomy framework. Its 9-stage pipeline specifies six of the seven governance architectures (SATA, ADARA, HMAA, MAIVA, FLAME, CARA) together with the IFF, BDA and EFFECTOR stages, as a Preliminary Design Phase reference architecture (TRL 2-3).
Related platforms: Rover Testbed (~$484) · UAV Platform (~$4,200) · BLADE-EDGE (defense, ~$139K) · BLADE-AV (automotive, ~$16K) · BLADE-MARITIME (maritime, ~$43K) · BLADE-INFRA (infrastructure, ~$12K) · BLADE-SPACE (orbital, ~$505K) · BLADE-CUAS (counter-UAS, ~$43.5K) · BLADE-AGENT-HSM (agentic AI, ~$199) · BLADE-SWARM (swarm autonomy, ~$1,333/node) · BLADE-INFRA-OT (IT/OT bridge governance, 1U fanless) · BLADE-FINANCE (financial-sector governance, ~$9K). Twelve hardware platforms in total: two physical research testbeds whose build is in progress (the rover and the UAV) and ten domain reference designs that have not been built; governance-stack portability is shown at design and simulation level only. Software companion: AUTHREX-SPACECYBER on AUTHREX Systems, a research application profile for onboard authority governance in orbital autonomy (single-author research, not deployed).
The BLADE-SPACE V&V Plan specifies a 20-test verification campaign with pass/fail criteria, equipment lists, and method per test. The plan covers functional, performance, environmental, reliability, and safety requirements from the SRD.
Three open Critical Items List entries (DC-DC single-string failures) require redundant converter addition before Critical Design Review. Vibration/TVAC/EMC qualification reports do not yet exist; V&V Plan specifies the campaign that will produce them.
Complete BLADE-SPACE Governance Node Preliminary Design Phase data package (15 engineering design documents). All files are original work by Burak Oktenli (independent researcher).
This project provides open artifacts for independent examination of the system design, component selection, and governance architecture.
Full schematic SVG (200 KB), CONFIG.json master configuration, ELECTRICAL_CONNECTIONS.json (134 connections), MECHANICAL_CONNECTIONS.json (117 attachments), all originals in the engineering package.
91-component PARTS.csv with manufacturer, MPN, description, export-control classification, cost, and source URL. Open the file in any spreadsheet tool; values reproduce the BOM table on this page.
VV_PLAN.md specifies the 20-test campaign with pass/fail criteria, equipment lists, and method per test. RTM.md links every SRD requirement to the test that verifies it.
DoDD 3000.09 (human-judgment principle for weapon systems, cited as context; this design is not a weapon), NASA SBIR EXPAND.3.S26B (spacecraft health management), GEVS vibration, ASTM E595 outgassing, NIST AI RMF.
The BLADE-SPACE Preliminary Design represents TRL 2-3. The roadmap below progresses through Critical Design Review (TRL 4), engineering-model fabrication (TRL 5), relevant-environment qualification (TRL 6), and operational infusion paths aligned with active U.S. Government programs. Each milestone is mapped to a specific funding vehicle or research initiative where the design is positioned to compete.
Submit Phase I proposal to EXPAND.3.S26B - Autonomous Onboard Health Management for Small Spacecraft and Distributed Systems under the NASA SBIR/STTR Program Year 2026 BAA (released 17 April 2026, valid through 30 September 2027). The subtopic explicitly accepts terrestrial Earth-analog testbed demonstrations in Phase I, with Phase II advancing to flight-hardware validation and Phase III to operational infusion. BLADE-SPACE's 9-stage governance pipeline maps directly to the subtopic's call for "continuous on-board health management capabilities to detect anomalies, diagnose, isolate" faults - particularly the unknown-fault response requirement (up to 40% of failure modes go unidentified through Key Decision Point E).
Surface the 11 Interface Control Documents publicly (currently in ZIP only); add Requirements Traceability Matrix excerpt; declare NASA-STD-8739.8 software safety class (Class B target for firing-path firmware); add NASA-STD-8719.27 lithium-battery hazard analysis for Saft VES16; build ESATAN-TMS network thermal model with worst-hot / worst-cold orbital cases; publish AP9/AE9 or SPENVIS orbit-environment run output backing the 30 krad TID system-level allocation; add ITAR USML Category XV(e) export-control flag on documentation cover.
Class V QML / Class S parts procurement (12-18 month lead time for rad-hard T2080 and RTG4); flight-harness fabrication per NASA-STD-8739.4; ESD-controlled clean-room assembly per ISO 14644 Class 8. Engineering Model build with single-string electrical functional validation, then assembly to flight-hardware-equivalent (FHE) configuration with full hot-redundant pairs.
Integrate the AUTHREX 9-stage authority pipeline with AFRL's STARS (Safe Trusted Autonomy for Responsible Spacecraft) Run-Time Assurance framework (an AFRL Seedlings for Disruptive Capabilities program). This is a proposed research-alignment target; no affiliation, sponsorship, or funding relationship exists. Map the HMAA authority-graduation model onto the published STARL (Space Trusted Autonomy Readiness Levels) scale. The HMAA hardware-enforced authority gating is complementary to STARS RTA safety-filtering and provides the physical-layer enforcement that RTA assumes but does not implement.
Vibration to GSFC-STD-7000A GEVS qualification levels (14.1 g_rms random, 5 minutes/axis); 1000 g half-sine pyrotechnic shock per MIL-STD-810G Method 516.7 (MIL-STD-810G is superseded by MIL-STD-810H); TVAC across -55°C to +85°C at <10⁻⁵ Torr; ASTM E595 outgassing (TML <1.0%, CVCM <0.1%); MIL-STD-461G EMC against CE102 / CS101 / RE102 / RS103 / CS114; helium leak per pressurized vessel applicable items.
Single-event characterization at TAMU Cyclotron Institute or LBNL 88-Inch Cyclotron over LET 0.5-80 MeV·cm²/mg per JESD57. Measure FPGA configuration upset cross-section, SBC latch-up threshold, DDR4 ECC scrub margin. Validate the 100 krad part-level / 30 krad system-level TID allocation through Co-60 gamma ray test at AFRL or DTRA-approved facility.
Align with the four 2026-2028 on-orbit servicing demonstrations: USSF/AFRL Tetra-5 (autonomous RPO + docking + inspection + refueling), Astroscale U.S. Provisioner (GEO hydrazine refueling, USSF SSC), SpaceLogistics MRV (Northrop Grumman, NRL robotic arm, DARPA-funded RSGS), and Astroscale ELSA-M (multi-client servicing/debris removal). Each demonstration requires hardware-enforced authority gating for proximity-operations maneuvers; BLADE-SPACE provides exactly that governance layer.
Position the MAIVA cross-string Byzantine consensus layer for integration with DARPA Oversight - autonomous constant custody of up to 1,000 targets with operator at aggregate level, not per-target. The BDA stage's post-event trust revalidation provides the "continual assurance" framework that DARPA Assured Autonomy specifies for Learning-Enabled Cyber-Physical Systems. Submit white-paper response to next Oversight BAA opening.
Position as the governance layer for the USSF Maneuverable GEO program (competition opened January 2026) and the broader USSF Race to Resilience initiative (FY2026 Space Force baseline appropriation $26.3B, approaching $40B with reconciliation funding via the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act"). Small / medium maneuverable commercial satellites in GEO require authority-graduated decision-making for autonomous orbit changes - the HMAA + FLAME + CARA stack is positioned for direct integration.
Multi-node MAIVA Byzantine consensus across N≥3 BLADE-SPACE governance nodes over inter-satellite optical link (Mynaric CONDOR Mk3); cross-satellite audit-chain hash continuity via ECDSA P-256 chain-of-trust; demonstrate authority-graduated decision-making across a constellation with degraded-node ride-through, swarm continuity under one-node-loss, and cross-satellite health exchange - all four primary capabilities called out in EXPAND.3.S26B.
This roadmap is contingent on funding, partnership, and procurement-pathway availability. Realistic flight-build cost (parts + AI&T NRE + flight qualification) for a 91-component rad-tolerant Class V LEO node is in the $1.5M-$2.5M range, not the $505,440 parts-only reference BOM. ITAR USML Category XV applies to multiple line items and constrains foreign-collaboration pathways. The 12-18 month lead times on Class V rad-hard parts (RTG4, Aitech S-A1760 Venus) drive Phase 2 timing. No NASA, USSF, or DARPA endorsement of BLADE-SPACE is claimed or implied; programs cited are real and current as of May 2026 and represent targeted submission vehicles, not awarded contracts.
No SDK package has been published; the code below illustrates a proposed interface. The proposed BLADE Governance SDK would provide a unified API across the BLADE platform family, with a single
blade_governance
library covering defense weapons governance (BLADE-EDGE), autonomous vehicle authority (BLADE-AV), maritime surveillance (BLADE-MARITIME), critical infrastructure protection (BLADE-INFRA), orbital autonomy (BLADE-SPACE), and counter-UAS authority (BLADE-CUAS); only the domain configuration file would change.
Cross-Domain Portability: The proposed blade_governance SDK would use the same evaluate() →
result API across every platform in the family.
Switching from orbital governance (BLADE-SPACE) to defense weapons authority (BLADE-EDGE) or any of the five would require changing only the YAML configuration file, not the application code.
The BLADE-SPACE Governance Node is part of the independent authority-governed autonomy research program by Burak Oktenli.
Related research architectures:
SATA (sensor trust),
HMAA (authority computation),
CARA (recovery),
MAIVA (multi-agent trust),
FLAME (latency control),
ADARA (deception-aware risk).
Companion BLADE reference designs (not built):
BLADE-EDGE (defense),
BLADE-AV (automotive),
BLADE-MARITIME (maritime),
BLADE-INFRA (critical infrastructure). BLADE-SPACE (orbital) is the fifth domain instantiation of the AUTHREX governance stack.