BLADE-INFRA-OT is the operational-technology companion to BLADE-INFRA, a focused IT/OT bridge variant that reuses approximately 70% of the parent platform.
A reference design (design package and bill of materials; not built) for a fail-closed, bump-in-the-wire AUTHREX inspection appliance to be installed at the IT/OT segmentation boundary. As designed, every cross-boundary command is parsed, scored, and adjudicated through the AUTHREX authority pipeline before it is allowed to reach operational-technology assets, and is then propagated, held for human deliberation, or isolated.
Reference Design (not built; TRL 2-3 hardware / 3-4 simulation) · Ninth BLADE Platform · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20342067BLADE-INFRA-OT is designed to govern what this work treats as the most failure-prone interface in critical-infrastructure security: the seam where corporate IT meets operational-technology control.
This work treats the IT/OT bridge as the most failure-prone interface in critical-infrastructure cybersecurity. BLADE-INFRA-OT is a focused variant of BLADE-INFRA that addresses this interface explicitly with the AUTHREX governance pipeline. Operational-technology environments, including water utilities, electric substations, gas pipelines, and building-management systems, have historically been protected by network segmentation alone.
The Purdue Reference Model assumed adversaries could not cross from the corporate IT zone into the control and field zones. That assumption has eroded. Rather than rely on segmentation as a static boundary, BLADE-INFRA-OT is designed to treat the boundary as an active adjudication point: it would read, classify, governance-check, and then forward or quarantine every cross-boundary message.
BLADE-INFRA-OT is framed against current operational-technology security guidance. It is designed with reference to the December 2025 CISA / Five Eyes joint principles for governing AI-influenced operational technology (self-assessed alignment; not an official determination), and its audit-ledger output is structured to support utility-sector reporting obligations.
Conventional IT/OT defense relies on static segmentation: firewalls, data diodes, and zone boundaries that assume an adversary cannot cross from the corporate network into the control network. Segmentation is binary and context-free. It does not reason about who issued a command, whether the command pattern is consistent with normal operations, whether the operator holds sufficient authority for the current plant state, or whether an AI-generated script is attempting to drive a physical actuator. In static segmentation of this kind, once traffic is permitted through a conduit, the individual command is not adjudicated further.
BLADE-INFRA-OT is designed to close that gap: it would treat each cross-boundary command as a governed event, adjudicated against provenance, message pattern, operator authority tier, and the active operational regime before it is allowed to reach a field device.
BLADE-INFRA-OT is the ninth instantiation of the AUTHREX authority-governance framework and the operational-technology companion to BLADE-INFRA. It reuses approximately 70% of the parent platform and applies the seven governance architectures in IT/OT-specific roles: SATA for boundary provenance, IFF for OT-target authentication, HMAA for operator authority-tier enforcement, ADARA for AI-script deception detection, MAIVA for inspection-node consensus, FLAME for bounded deliberation on high-stakes writes, and CARA for deterministic isolation on detected compromise, with ERAM providing risk-based gating across the pipeline.
BLADE-INFRA-OT is designed as a bump-in-the-wire appliance at the IT/OT segmentation boundary. In the design, all cross-boundary traffic is read, classified, governance-checked, and then forwarded or quarantined. Each command is resolved to one of three actions.
Four OT authority regimes (NOMINAL, ELEVATED, LOCKDOWN, SAFE-HALT) change how strictly commands are adjudicated. Malformed input fails closed by default. Every decision is written to a seed-deterministic, SHA-256 hash-chained, tamper-evident audit ledger.
Every cross-boundary message is evaluated through eight AUTHREX stages before an adjudication is issued.
BLADE-INFRA-OT reuses approximately 70% of the parent BLADE-INFRA platform, extending it for operational-technology bridge operations rather than re-deriving the governance core.
In the design, the governance plane is assigned to a Xilinx Kria K26 industrial system-on-module and the network plane to a separate x86 fanless single-board computer, isolating packet handling from adjudication. A Microchip ATECC608 secure element is specified as the hardware root of trust, a TPM 2.0 module anchors platform state, and a Form C fault relay drives a fail-safe output. A managed Ethernet switch with SFP+ uplinks segregates IT-side and OT-side interfaces, and an out-of-band management module supports administration without traversing the data path.
The appliance is designed to parse and adjudicate the industrial protocols common at the IT/OT boundary, such as Modbus/TCP, DNP3, OPC UA, EtherNet/IP, and IEC 61850. Adjudication operates at the command level: for example, a SCADA pump-start issued as a Modbus write-holding-register is checked for operator provenance, baseline-consistent message pattern, and authority tier before it is permitted to propagate to the field device.
BLADE-INFRA-OT is designed to install inline at the segmentation boundary so that no cross-boundary command can reach operational-technology assets without traversing the governance node. If the appliance cannot parse, authenticate, or authorize a message, the message is isolated rather than forwarded. The specified default state on fault, power loss, or tamper is closed, preserving the safety posture of the protected control zone.
BLADE-INFRA-OT is designed to default to the safe state. A Form C fault relay is specified to drive a fail-closed output, and the appliance isolates rather than forwards whenever it cannot parse, authenticate, or authorize a cross-boundary command. On power loss, fault, or detected tamper, the bridge latches closed, preserving the safety posture of the protected control zone. Adjudication and packet handling are assigned to physically separate planes, designed so that a fault in the network plane cannot silently grant authority on the governance plane.
A commercial-off-the-shelf reference design in a fanless, conformal-coated, industrial-temperature enclosure. No hardware has been fabricated; the design is a research reference at TRL 2-3, with the simulation tier at TRL 3-4.
The design separates the governance plane (a Xilinx Kria K26 industrial system-on-module assigned to adjudication) from the network plane (an x86 fanless single-board computer assigned to packet I/O), designed so that a compromise or fault in packet handling cannot bypass adjudication. A managed Ethernet switch with SFP+ uplinks segregates the IT-side and OT-side interfaces, an out-of-band management module supports administration off the data path, and a conduction-cooled, conformal-coated, industrial-temperature build (-40 to +70C, design target; not tested) is specified for continuous operation. Recovery from an authority lockout follows the deterministic CARA recovery model used across the BLADE family.
Full subsystem node graph color-coded by type (MCU, Sensor, Actuator, Power, Module, Display). Shows the governance-plane and network-plane compute, managed switch with SFP+ ports, ATECC608 root of trust, TPM 2.0, Form C fault relay, DC/DC power, and status LEDs, connected by data, power, and ground edges.
Typical configuration with industrial temperature range, fanless operation, conformal-coated PCB, and 1U rack-mount or DIN-rail mounting. Engineering margin is included.
| Category | USD |
|---|---|
| Xilinx Kria K26 SOM (governance plane) | 3,000 |
| x86 Atom fanless SBC (network plane) | 1,800 |
| 4x GbE + 2x SFP+ switch chip | 400 |
| TPM 2.0 + secure element | 60 |
| Out-of-band management module | 200 |
| 1U rack-mount chassis (industrial) | 400 |
| Industrial-grade power supply | 300 |
| Conformal coating, gasketing | 150 |
| Internal cabling | 100 |
| Documentation & ICD | 1,500 |
| Integration & first-article test | 3,500 |
| Engineering margin (~25%) | 3,000 |
| Total typical configuration | 14,410 |
A deterministic, browser-based simulator demonstrates the IT/OT bridge governance pipeline across four scripted scenarios: nominal operation (a water-utility pump-start command), an attempted attack, authorized maintenance, and a multi-utility coordinated probe.
The interface adds a split IT/OT viewport, exposes the eight-stage pipeline per message, supports malformed and Byzantine forged-authority injection, clock drift, and operator-clearance delay, and records every decision to a seed-deterministic, SHA-256 hash-chained audit ledger with CSV export.
The simulator injects malformed and Byzantine forged-authority traffic, applies clock drift and operator-clearance delay, and shows fail-closed behavior on every malformed input in the scripted scenarios. Each decision is written to a seed-deterministic, SHA-256 hash-chained audit ledger that can be exported as CSV and verified for tampering. A simulation verification-and-validation record accompanies the deposit. These are simulation results; no hardware has been built.
The simulation is evaluated against documented IT/OT threat patterns using a seed-deterministic, scenario-driven methodology. Each scenario fixes the authority regime, the message stream, and the seed, so a given configuration reproduces an identical decision trace and audit ledger for independent verification.
| Scenario | Protocol / Trigger | Pipeline Response | Adjudication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nominal pump start | Modbus write-holding-register | SATA provenance, ADARA baseline-consistent, HMAA tier T3 | PROPAGATE |
| Attempted attack | Forged-authority write | SATA / HMAA failure, CARA isolation | ISOLATE |
| Authorized maintenance | Elevated-regime action | FLAME bounded deliberation, operator clearance | HOLD, then PROPAGATE |
| Multi-utility probe | Distributed cross-utility traffic | MAIVA consensus, escalation to LOCKDOWN | ISOLATE |
Standards alignment (self-assessed; not a compliance, certification or assessment determination) is inherited from BLADE-INFRA and extended for IT/OT bridge operations. Under NERC CIP, the appliance is designed to support CIP-005 electronic security perimeter, CIP-007 system security management, and CIP-010 configuration change management, with audit-ledger output structured for CIP-008 incident response. Under IEC 62443, BLADE-INFRA-OT is designed to function as a conduit gateway between SL-1 IT zones and SL-3+ OT zones (security levels are design targets; not tested, certified or assessed). Its cryptographic boundary is designed to align with the parent BLADE-INFRA cryptographic-module specification, and it is designed with reference to the December 2025 CISA / Five Eyes operational-technology principles.
BLADE-INFRA-OT is the ninth instantiation of the AUTHREX authority-governance framework and the operational-technology companion to BLADE-INFRA. The seven governance architectures (SATA, HMAA, ADARA, MAIVA, FLAME, CARA, ERAM) are reused in their IT/OT-bridge roles, and the same governance pipeline and evidence design specified across the BLADE family reference designs is applied to the IT/OT seam rather than re-derived.
Related platforms: Rover Testbed (~$484) · UAV Platform (~$4,200) · BLADE-EDGE (defense, ~$139K) · BLADE-AV (automotive, ~$16K) · BLADE-MARITIME (maritime, ~$43K) · BLADE-INFRA (infrastructure, ~$12K) · BLADE-SPACE (orbital, ~$505K) · BLADE-CUAS (counter-UAS, ~$43.5K) · BLADE-AGENT-HSM (agentic AI, ~$199) · BLADE-SWARM (swarm autonomy, ~$1,333/node) · BLADE-INFRA-OT (IT/OT bridge governance, 1U fanless) · BLADE-FINANCE (financial-sector governance, ~$9K). Twelve hardware platforms: two physical research testbeds whose build is in progress (the rover and the UAV) and ten domain reference designs that have not been built; governance-stack portability is shown at design and simulation level only. Software companion: AUTHREX-ICS-GATE on AUTHREX Systems, the OT authority-governance software this appliance design would anchor in hardware.
No SDK package has been published; the code below illustrates a proposed interface. In the proposed interface, BLADE-INFRA-OT would be configured through the same unified governance API proposed across the BLADE family: the host would open the node, submit a cross-boundary command, and receive an adjudication, with only the configuration changing between domains.
Cross-domain portability: the same proposed API would serve BLADE-INFRA-OT and the other BLADE reference designs. Switching from a defense node to an IT/OT bridge would change the configuration, not the application code.
The BLADE-INFRA-OT paper, working paper, interface-control document, assembly guide, and the complete reference-design files are deposited on Zenodo under DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20342067 (CC BY 4.0, v1.0).
| Document | Description |
|---|---|
| Zenodo Paper (PDF) | Authority-Governed IT/OT Bridge for Cross-Boundary OT Command Adjudication. |
| Working Paper (PDF) | Authority Governance for IT/OT Bridge Operations. |
| Interface Control Document | ICD-INFRA-OT-001: hardware interface control document. |
| Full Repository | All deposited files: simulator, paper, ICD, assembly guide, schematic, BOM, connection graphs, and V&V record. |
BLADE-INFRA-OT hardware is at approximately TRL 2-3 (specification and reference design); the simulation tier is at approximately TRL 3-4 (a deterministic research demonstrator running real Web Crypto SHA-256). No hardware has been fabricated, and no penetration testing against an operational utility has been performed.
Reference design with the system schematic, 48-line BOM, 35 electrical and 42 mechanical connections, and the 1U fanless enclosure. No hardware has been built.
Browser-native, deterministic, four scripted scenarios, four authority regimes, fail-closed handling, and a SHA-256 hash-chained audit ledger with CSV export.
Build the 1U first article, bring up the governance and network planes, the managed switch, and the root of trust, and verify the adjudication path end to end.
Extend and fuzz the Modbus, DNP3, OPC UA, EtherNet/IP, and IEC 61850 parsers against malformed and adversarial frames.
Connect the governance node to a benchtop PLC and HMI to validate adjudication latency and fail-closed behavior under realistic control traffic.
Characterize false-hold and false-propagate rates across the four authority regimes and tune the risk-based gating thresholds.
BLADE-INFRA-OT provides open artifacts for independent examination of the adjudication behavior, the reference hardware design, and the simulation. All files are published open-access on Zenodo (DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20342067) and mirrored in the repository.
A self-contained HTML simulator with real Web Crypto SHA-256, a deterministic clock, four scenarios, fault and Byzantine injection, CSV export, and an audit-ledger verifier.
System schematic, 48-line BOM, electrical (35) and mechanical (42) connection maps, the ICD, and the first-article assembly guide.
A simulation verification-and-validation record covering the four scenarios, the four authority regimes, fail-closed handling, and audit-ledger integrity.
NIST SP 800-82, ISA/IEC 62443 zones and conduits, NERC CIP-005/007/008/010, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, and the CISA / Five Eyes OT principles.
BLADE-INFRA-OT is a fundamental-research deliverable: a hardware reference design (not built) specified from commercial off-the-shelf components, an interactive simulation, an open interface-control document, and a working paper, published openly (documents under CC BY 4.0, as recorded on the Zenodo deposit; the simulation code is also offered under the MIT License). No penetration testing is performed; the simulation is scripted against documented threat patterns rather than against any operational utility. The status frame is TRL 3-4 for the simulation tier and TRL 2-3 for the hardware tier. Within the AUTHREX program, BLADE-INFRA-OT is the ninth BLADE platform and the operational-technology companion to BLADE-INFRA.
Hardware specification, papers, and the full Zenodo deposit. Deposit documents are CC BY 4.0, as recorded on Zenodo; the simulator and other code on this site are also offered under the MIT License.
The BLADE-INFRA-OT Governance Node is part of the independent authority-governed autonomy research program by Burak Oktenli. It is the ninth domain instantiation of the BLADE governance framework and the operational-technology companion to BLADE-INFRA, intended to show, at design and simulation level only, that the same authority and evidence design developed across defense, automotive, maritime, critical-infrastructure, orbital, counter-UAS, agentic-AI, and swarm reference designs applies to governing the IT/OT bridge.
Related architectures: SATA · HMAA · CARA · MAIVA · FLAME · ADARA · ERAM
Oktenli, B. (2026). BLADE-INFRA-OT Governance Node: Authority-Governed IT/OT Bridge for Cross-Boundary OT Command Adjudication. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20342067